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Preface
"Understanding the details of demand and knowing how they t into the system
are very important."
[Prof. Ariel Pakes, Harvard, in The Harvard University Gazette (January
27th, 2000)]
This thesis consists of three essays in industrial organization. Reading the
titles of these essays one is tempted to conclude that this sentence already
exhausts the similarities between them. Indeed it is di¢ cult to see an inte-
grative topic behind three completely di¤erent subjects such as the regulation
of the hospital market, non-informative advertising and smoking bans in bars.
In terms of content, I confess, this is true. There is, however, another more
subliminal concept of economics standing behind these three papers, a philos-
ophy that the quote by Ariel Pakes hints at: When we, as economists, want to
make recommendations for real world problems, we have to study the details of
the respective industry, because these details can matter a lot. In particular,
a general economic concept may work in theory and it may even work in a
number of industries, but in some other industries it may fail. An example of
this can be found in Chapter 1 of this dissertation. Yardstick competition may
be a good concept in the electricity industry, but it is not such a good idea
in the hospital market. Therefore, the ultimate step in economic theorizing
must be the study of specic market environments. This is what I do in this
thesis. I use industrial economics to analyze three very specic questions that
are currently controversially debated in Germany: First, the reform of hospital
regulation. Second, the question whether the legislation should enact a general
smoking ban. Third, whether advertising may induce our society to consume
excessively.
Preface 2
Chapter 1 of this thesis is concerned with the regulation of the hospital
sector. It is obvious that hospitals are extremely important for the well-being
of the population. What is less known is that this sector is also of great
economic signicance. In Germany, there are 3.634 hospitals and Reha-Centers
containing 749.473 beds and employing 1.2 million people. The expenditures
for hospital care amount to 85 billion Euros.1 It is obviously of fundamental
importance for a nation and its economy that its hospitals provide high quality
of care, but also work e¢ ciently.
This, however, is not so easy to achieve, because the hospital sector is very
di¤erent from other sectors. In most industries the market has proven to be
the most e¢ cient form of organization. Supply and demand are matched via
a price that uctuates freely and contains all (or at least most of) the relevant
information. In the hospital industry, however, market mechanisms are widely
absent. While there are a number of reasons for this, the most important one is
that a price mechanism is very di¢ cult to implement. "Consumers" of hospital
care dont pay prices to hospitals. Due to the big risks involved in health care,
they rather pay fees to insurances and can then choose freely among hospitals.
For hospital services a market in which the price matches supply and demand
is therefore absent. What is more, the third-party payer principle implies a
moral hazard problem on the demand side. Since a patient does not bear
directly the costs of treatment he is tempted to demand the highest quality
and quantity of service convenient to him. As pointed out in the medical arms
race literature (see e.g. Robinson and Luft (1985)), it is therefore quality that
is the salient competitive factor, and the market is prone to excess demand
and supply.
These imperfections of the market call for governmental intervention, and,
indeed, the hospital sector is one of the most extensively regulated sectors in
an economy. It deals with market entry (both by hospitals and by physicians),
product o¤ering (not every hospital and doctor can o¤er all services) and
pricing. Of special interest in this dissertation is the last point, the pricing.
As mentioned above, hospitals are typically not paid by their patients di-
rectly, but by insurance companies. The way these payments are made is
regulated by the government. Until the year 2000, German insurances and
1Data for the year 2000. Source: Bundesministerium für Gesundheit (2000).
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regulators had used a cost-of-service regulation (CoSR) to nance the hos-
pitals. Practically, this meant that hospitals simply got reimbursed all their
(reasonable) costs. The advantages of this system were that the regulator did
not need much information other than cost reports and a rough assessment
whether those reports were correct. Furthermore, quality of care was quite
high, because doctors had no nancial loss from providing high quality. The
disadvantage of such a system was, though, that it lacked incentives for the
hospitals to minimize costs.
In response to tightening budget constraints in the 1990s, German politi-
cians and insurers were therefore eager to do something about the costs. In
2000, the Bundestag passed a set of laws to reform the health care system. This
reform included a change of the hospital regulation. In essence, this change
consisted of a switch from the cost-of-service regulation to a prospective pay-
ment system (PPS). In a PPS, a patient is assigned according to his diagnosis
into a certain group (diagnosis related group = DRG). The hospital then re-
ceives a predetermined amount of money ("price" as we will say henceforth)
for the treatment of this patient. The advantage of this regulatory scheme
is that it sets incentives to minimize costs, because it makes the hospital the
residual claimant of prots. Whether this theoretic prediction holds what it
promises and whether quality of care does not su¤er, is, however, an open
question. The experiences are mixed.
Prospective payment systems as part of hospital regulation were rst in-
troduced in the U.S. in the early 1980s. Since then, there has been a lot of
e¤ort to assess the e¤ectiveness of PPS. Empirical research, however, faces
signicant problems in the eld of hospital care, mostly because data on the
key parameters (cost reduction e¤orts and quality of care) are typically not
available. Consequently, econometricians have to improvise a lot and use very
crude indirect measures such as length of stay for cost reduction e¤ort and
mortality rates for quality.2 Unsurprisingly, the results are therefore mixed.
Some estimates indicate increases in e¢ ciency and/or quality, others the oppo-
site. Unfortunately, research for other countries is scarce and faces even more
serious data problems. Especially in Germany reliable databases on quality
2For a more detailed description of the obstacles in emprical research on hospitals and
the means to overcome them see e.g. Chalkley and Malcomson (2000) and Romano and
Mutter (2004).
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in hospitals are scarce. But anecdotal evidence about decline in quality in
hospitals is abundant. Since the introduction of the reform, the German news
agenda is full of nation-wide strikes of hospital employees, decreased care in-
tensity, rejection of patients and bankruptcies of rural area hospitals. While
patients experience treatment by overworked doctors and nurses, the gradu-
ates from medical schools wonder whether they should really start a career in
which they have to work 70 hours per week plus some nights and the weekend
on on-call duty for less than 2000 Euros per month. They can earn twice the
amount in e.g. Great Britain for less work or leave the profession for a lucrative
job in the pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, thousands of vacancies at
hospitals cannot be lled. Overall, the experiences with PPS in the real world
are mixed, at best, and certainly justify a closer look at the theory. Is PPS
a suitable alternative for the regulation of hospitals, at all? Or does practical
regulation only deviate too much from theoretic suggestions?
Since the early 1980s there has been an ongoing discussion among health
economists whether a PPS performs better than CoSR or not or whether a
mixed system is superior. A basic problem of PPS in the hospital sector is
that prices cannot be made contingent on quality of service, because quality
is typically unveriable by regulators. The reason lies in the complexity of
the "product", i.e. the way health outcomes are produced. Consequently,
it did not take long until Ellis and McGuire (1986) pointed out that quality
of care could su¤er under a PPS, because PPS makes prots independent of
quality. If quality is only costly but does not yield any benets, a prot oriented
hospital will set quality to zero. This argument was critized by Pope (1989)
who pointed out that hospital demand (and therewith also prots) depends
at least to some extent on quality. Although quality may not be directly
veriable by the regulator, word of mouth recommendations will always drive
patients away from hospitals with low quality. Competition will therefore force
a hospital to provide high quality. This optimistic view of PPS was advanced
by Ma (1994) who used a multitask agent model to show that PPS can in
principle even induce rst best provision of quality and cost reduction e¤ort.
Here is where my dissertation picks up. In Mas model the price a hospital
receives is crucial. To compute the right price, a regulator needs to have a lot
of information on the hospital, in particular its cost function. But in the real
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world this is typically not the case. Regulators have little knowledge about
hospital cost functions. Consequently, they typically prove inapt to determine
the optimal price and have to rely on other methods for price-setting. The
tool that is recommended by the literature and that regulators usually use
is called "yardstick competition". The logic of yardstick competition is best
and most prominently described by Shleifer (1985). If the regulator has no
knowledge about a rms cost function, but can observe only its cost level,
he can use other, comparable rmscost levels as reference points for pricing
that respective rm. Shleifer demonstrates that corresponding marginal cost
pricing yields rst best outcomes and correctly adapted average cost pricing
at least second best production.
It is very important to note, however, that the rather general setting
Shleifer uses is incapable of capturing the many ways in which the hospital
sector di¤ers from other sectors, as described at the beginning of this preface.
In particular, in Shleifers model demand depends on price and quality does
not play any role. In line with Ariel Pakescitation above, these details may,
however, matter a lot. It is the purpose of the rst chapter of my dissertation
to ll this gap in the literature. Hence, Chapter 1 analyses what happens if
yardstick competition a la Shleifer (1985) is applied in the specic environment
of the hospital sector as described by Ma (1994). I show that Shleifers results
do not persist. Hospitals will respond to this sort of pricing by decreasing qual-
ity of care to zero. In this sense, my dissertation predicts that properly applied
yardstick competition regulation of hospitals results in serious distortions in
the supply of hospital care.
The scientic contribution that Chapter 1 of my dissertation makes is
to link two strands of literature, namely the health economics literature on
prospective payment systems together with the regulation literature on yard-
stick competition. Chapter 1 advances the understanding of what prospective
payment systems can realistically achieve in the regulation of the hospital sec-
tor.
The policy recommendation of Chapter 1 is to reconsider the use of prospec-
tive payment systems as the main tool for nancing hospitals. If we use PPS,
we need to think extensively about how we set the prices and about how we
monitor the quality of service.
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Chapter 2 addresses another controversially debated regulation issue. In
Germany there are around 240.000 restaurants, cafés, bars, etc. In only about
800 of them smoking is prohibited.3 This makes a ratio of 0.3%. In contrast to
this, 76% of Germans (or 54 million) are non-smokers.4 Furthermore, according
to a survey by the Allensbach Institute, 47% of Germans support a general
smoking ban in taverns, while only 41% are against it.5 Although there are
various ways these numbers can be interpreted, they strongly suggest that there
is some sort of market failure. If so, governmental intervention in the form of
a general smoking ban in taverns is desirable, just as it has been (partially)
introduced in numerous other countries like the U.S., Italy, Ireland, Spain, etc.
Despite these numbers, the strongest argument put forward by opponents
of smoking bans is that the free market solves the question itself. If it were in
the interest of consumers, they say, tavern owners would prohibit smoking in
their domain and benet from the increased demand.
It is the aim of Chapter 2 to analyze whether this argument is valid. Is
it true that prot maximizing tavern owners have an interest to act in their
consumersinterest? Do prot maximization and welfare maximization always
lead to identical results with respect to smoking bans?
In the economic literature this question has received little attention, al-
though a general smoking ban (and its omission alike) a¤ects the lives of
millions of people every day and has enormous health as well as economic
consequences. Only a very small number of papers (mostly funded by the
Philip Morris Management Corporation) analyzes the question whether or not
smoking bans in taverns are benecial or not. All of these papers are either
empirical (e.g. Dunham and Marlow (2000, 2003 and 2004) or purely verbal
(e.g. Lee (1991) and Tollison and Wagner (1992)). Section 2.2 gives an ex-
haustive and detailed literature overview. Here it su¢ ces to understand the
basic hypothesis that all of the cited papers share.
It is widely acknowledged that smoking produces negative externalities.
3These numbers are taken from the article "Freiwillige Verpichtungen wirken nicht"
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, August 20th, 2006) by Michael Krzyanowski, unit
head of the German o¢ ce of the World Health Organization.
4People who smoke daily in percentage of people 15 years or older. Source: Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005).
5Source: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach Gesellschaft zum Studium der ö¤entlichen
Meinung mbH, IfD Umfrage 7091, July 2006.
Preface 7
When a smoker smokes, people around him su¤er from bad air and adverse
health e¤ects.6 On the other side, smokers obviously have some utility from
smoking. In principle, this is therefore a classic social cost problem a la Coase
(1960). Unfortunately, the Coase Theorem does not apply, at least not di-
rectly, because transaction costs are prohibitively high. The authors cited
above, however, claim that the Coase Theorem applies somewhat indirectly.
The reason is that the theorem requires only two conditions, both of which
are fullled in the gastronomic market, they say. First, property rights must
be clearly assigned. This is the case, because the owner of a bar also owns the
air space in his bar. He can do with it what he wants. Second, transaction
costs must be zero. This requirement is also met, the authors argue, because
the owner of the bar acts as an intermediary between his guests. He internal-
izes the negative externalities caused by the smokers and allocates air space
accordingly. If it is in his consumersinterest to prohibit smoking, he would
do so. None of the cited papers is, however, able to verify this hypothesis in a
convincing manner.
To the best of my knowledge there exists no stringent mircoeconomic model
to clarify that the above hypothesis is correct. It is the aim of Chapter 2 of
this dissertation to ll this gap. I do so by setting up a model of two bars, one
seated at one end of a Hotelling line, the other seated at the other end. They
compete via prices for two kinds of consumers, both uniformly distributed in
the space between the two bars. The rst sort of consumers is of the non-
smoker type and is of mass Nns. The other is of the smoker type and is of
mass Ns. While the rst group su¤ers negative externalities from smoke and
the second group enjoys utility from being allowed to smoke, both appreciate
the presence of other customers in the form of positive network externalities.
It is important to note that also the negative externalities have a network
character. The reason is that the smoke one smoker produces spreads evenly
in the air space and causes negative externalities for every non-smoker in the
bar.
I then calculate three cases. First, both pubs allow smoking. Second, both
pubs ban smoking (either voluntarily or forced by law). Third, one pub pro-
6For a study on the danger of passive smoking see e.g. Deutsches Krebsforschungszen-
trum, Heidelberg (2005).
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hibits smoking unilaterally. I then compare the prots realized by the non-
smoker pub in the third case with the prots it would make had it not pro-
hibited smoking, i.e. the prots in the rst case. The resulting inequality
is compared to the condition that determines that welfare in the second case
(general ban of smoking) is larger than in the rst (no ban). I show that they
do not exclude each other. I conclude from this that it is possible that bars
do not ban smoking in their domain, even though it is in the publics interest.
The reason for this result lies in the network character of the negative exter-
nalities caused by smoking. Negative network externalities soften competition.
This is why it is in the interest of pubs to allow smoking in their domain. We
see again the validity of Pakesquote conrmed here. The details of demand
matter and can generate counter-intuitive outcomes.
The scientic contribution of this chapter is to provide the rst microeco-
nomic model to answer the question whether general smoking bans in taverns
are a legitimate governmental intervention in the market or not.
The policy recommendation that follows from this chapter is that a general
smoking ban may very well be welfare increasing. The German government
should support further research in this eld to assess whether market failure
is indeed present or not.
Chapter 3 is concerned with microeconomic modelling of advertising, its
e¤ect on consumers behavior and on welfare. This is an interesting topic,
because, on the one side, the seductive character of advertising raises a lot
of scepticism about its welfare e¤ect. On the other side, advertising is so
omnipresent and such a big economic factor that it is hard to ignore. We
encounter advertisements everywhere in our lives. In the morning, when we
listen to the radio, the yers we nd in our mailbox when we get the newspaper,
the ads in the newspaper itself. On the way to work we pass advertising pillars,
huge screens and posters installed on house facades and roofs, posters at the
buss stop or in the underground trains. At work, we receive spam mail when
we open our email accounts and have to click away pop-up advertising when
we open websites. In the evening we are confronted with commercial spots in
TV or in the cinema. Advertising spending in U.S., only, amounts to $143.3
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billion.7
Some of this advertising contains useful information like prices and loca-
tions of vendors. It thereby reduces frictions in the economy and is, thus,
benecial for the consumer and the economy as whole. Chamberlin (1933)
acknowledged this early on and Ozga (1960), Stigler (1961) and Telser (1964)
formalized his verbal argumentation into a formal theory of informative adver-
tising.
The bulk of advertising, however, does not contain this sort of explicit in-
formation. The prime example for this kind of advertising are probably TV
commercial spots. In them we usually see some person consuming some good.
We do not receive any information that goes beyond the pure existence of the
good, some information on its basic characteristics (at the level of "This is a
car. It can drive.") and the suggestion that its consumption yields pleasure.
While the informative view of advertising can also be applied on this sort of
advertising, it does not seem to capture the whole story, not all e¤ects that this
non-informative advertising can have. Consequently, researchers have devel-
oped other explanations of the cognitive and psychological processes associated
with non-informative advertising.
Some of these economists express the suspicion that advertising can have
a persuasive character and alter the consumers tastes and wants. Also this
is acknowledged by Chamberlin (1933). He captures this e¤ect by assuming
that advertising shifts the demand curve outward. Subsequent research by
e.g. Robinson (1933), Kaldor (1950), Galbraith (1958) Commanor and Wil-
son (1967) elaborates on this. Unfortunately, however, these studies typically
lack microeconomic modelling of consumers behavior. The reason for this -
and at the same time the main criticism - is that this theory implies a change
of the consumers preference ordering. This, however, is a violation of the
basic microeconomic assumption of rationality. Furthermore, without a strin-
gent theory on how advertising a¤ects peoples consumption decision, welfare
analysis is impossible, or at least incomplete. Thus, although the "persuasive
view" yields some key insights, it is insu¢ cient in explaining how people react
to non-informative advertising.
Nelson (1970, 1974) o¤ers another theory. He claims that only those rms
7Number for 2005, according to TNS Media Intelligence (2006).
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advertise who produce high quality. His argument is the following. Most
goods are experience goods, the real quality of which can only be judged by
consuming them. Additionally, most goods are substituted by a new version
after a while (due to e.g. decay of quality and functionality). Thus, people
will get to a situation in which they have to repurchase a good and then they
will buy from the same brand only if they were content with the old version.
Hence, a seller of high quality products gains more from selling to a person
than a producer of low quality. Consequently, he can more easily a¤ord to
push sales by advertisement. Unfortunately, Nelson does not provide a formal
analysis of his reasoning. Subsequent researchers, as for example Schmalensee
(1978), do so and raise doubts on the validity of Nelsons line of argument.
A producer of low quality, for instance, is likely to have low costs and will
therefore also gain considerably from demand expansion.
Yet another view is taken by Becker and Murphy (1993). They assume
that a good and its advertisement are complements. Consequently, as adver-
tisement increases, so does the marginal utility of the good itself and therewith
also the demand for it. The authors advertise their model as one allowing for
normative welfare analysis and for being able to explain demand increasing
e¤ects of advertising without violating the rationality assumption. On the
other side, their approach exhibits some awkward features. First, their ex-
planation for why advertising shall be a complement is somewhat blurry. It
seems intuitive to assume that advertising raises the social prestige associated
with the respective good. But this matters only, if peers watch the advertising.
Ones own consumption of this publicity seems rather irrelevant. Second, com-
plementarity also works the other way around. That is, the more I consume
a good, the more I enjoy consuming the commercial for it - which appears
counter-intuitive as the authors admit themselves.
I conclude from this little overview of the literature that the theory on
advertising is still somewhat incomplete and leaves open a number of questions.
Chapter 3 of my dissertation addresses these issues and o¤ers another (in
parts complementary) theory of non-informative advertising. It consists of two
elements. First, I assume that people usually make their consumption decisions
in a social environment. I model this feature with an adjusted version of the
theory of inequity aversion. Second, I argue that advertising can be seen as a
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tool to change peoples reference groups. The model fullls all the requirements
desired from a theory of advertising: It explains why advertising can increase
demand; allows for the analysis of welfare as well as competition issues; and can
capture utility increasing as well as utility decreasing e¤ects. In particular, it
is explained why and when what sort of advertising increases demand by which
people and for which good. It is shown that the welfare e¤ect can be positive
as well as negative and gives conditions for when either is the case. The same
is done for the impact on utility, which can also be positive or negative.
In essence, my theory of non-informative advertising is the mathematical,
microeconomic formulation of a suspicion that has already been expressed ver-
bally by other authors. In his 2004 article Samuelson gives an evolutionary
explanation for why most peoples preferences exhibit relative consumption
e¤ects. In the conclusion of his paper he contends that "The development
of modern advertising and mass communications may accentuate the visibil-
ity of high consumption e¤ects." (p. 110), which is exactly what I mean by
the second element of my theory. Similarly, also Becker and Murphy (1993)
themselves admit that "To be sure, consumers may respond to the social and
psychological pressures generated by advertisements." (p. 942).
Frank (1999) wrote a whole book on issues like conspicuous consumption,
social preferences and alike. In his chapter on advertising related issues he
states that "[...] most of us are surprised to discover how strongly our choices
and evaluations are inuenced by information that we happen to have readily
at hand." (p. 176) He then refers to Kahnemann, Slovic and Tverskys (1982)
famous experience. Kahnemann et al. asked test persons to spin a wheel on
which numbers from 1 to 100 were written. After the wheel stopped and one
number was displayed, they asked the individuals to estimate the percentage
of African states that were member of the U.N. The result was that peoples
answers were signicantly correlated with the number displayed on the wheel.
This example demonstrates that subconsciously people can be inuenced by
obviously irrelevant information. With respect to advertising this implies: "Be-
cause the things we see most often are most readily available in memory, they
tend to have disproportionate inuence on our spending decisions." (Frank, p.
177).
In this sense, the scientic contribution of Chapter 3 is twofold. First, I
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provide a model of advertising that can explain how advertising can increase
demand and why it can be utility decreasing or increasing as well as allows
for standard welfare analysis and the study of competitive e¤ects. Second, the
model constitutes the microeconomic formulation of the suspicion that adver-
tising spurs consumption by pushing social comparisons and envy e¤ects. In
this context, a somewhat surprising result of my paper is that this very nega-
tive view of advertising does not necessarily imply welfare losses. The reasons
are that, on the one hand, due to price being larger than costs, consumption
may be too low in the outset, and, on the other hand, that in this consump-
tion game also producers of lower quality goods advertise, thereby keeping the
system in balance.
Chapter 1
Yardstick Competition when
Quality is Endogenous
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1.1 Introduction
Until recently, hospitals in most countries have been nanced by a cost-of-
service regulation (CoSR1) scheme, i.e. they were simply reimbursed all their
costs. The problem with this type of regulatory policy is that it lacks incentives
to control expenditures. In reaction to rising health care costs an increasing
number of countries therefore changes the regulation of their hospital mar-
kets. The main component of this change is typically a switch from CoSR
to a prospective payment system (PPS). In a PPS illnesses are categorized
according to their diagnosis into about 500 di¤erent groups (diagnosis related
group = DRG). A hospital gets the same pre-determined price per patient in a
specic group. The basic logic of this system is simple: Giving it a xed price
for a patient, it is then the hospital who bears the costs of treatment. This
will motivate the hospital to minimize costs.
Experience in practice, however, renders the view of PPS less positive than
had been hoped. In Germany, for example, already the partial introduction of
PPS has had a number of undesirable or at least questionable e¤ects. The most
prominent of those are overworked doctors and nurses, nation wide strikes,
emigration of qualied personal to other European countries, decreased care
intensity, rejection of patients, and bankruptcies of rural area hospitals.2
This emphasizes that costs are only one dimension of a hospitals activity.
The second dimension is quality of care. As a matter of fact, there is hardly
any other product in which quality is so important for the customer as in
health care. Consequently, there has been a lot of concern whether a PPS
may not also have negative e¤ects on the quality provision. Ever since a PPS
was rst introduced in the U.S. in the early eighties, this issue has received
considerable attention in the literature. Ellis and McGuire (1986) were the rst
to point out the basic problem of a PPS: If quality is costly, a xed price gives
incentives to reduce quality. The major counterargument is brought up by
1We use the abbreviation CoSR instead of the commonly used FFS (fee for service),
because we experienced some confusion in discussions when using FFS. The reason seems
to be that feesounds more like a pricing mechanism than like cost reimbursement.
2Especially the last two points cause increasing grief, because they imply that patients
have to travel longer distances for treatment. Since these transport costs do not only consist
of fuel and time consumption but also of risk of accidents and worsening of health condition
due to delayed treatment, they are estimated to have a signicant negative e¤ect on a
patients utility. See e.g. Ho (2005) for details.
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Pope (1989). He argues that since patients do not pay for treatment directly,
hospital demand depends mostly on quality. Consequently, hospitals have an
interest in retaining high reputation in order to attract patients. This could
set incentives strong enough to provide high quality. As a matter of fact, Ma
(1994) demonstrates in a multitask agent model that PPS may even achieve
the rst best allocation in cost as well as in quality e¤ort - if prices are set
correctly.
This last ifis, however, crucial. None of the relevant papers discusses the
regulators ability to set prices correctly. In particular, Ma states conditions
that prices must fulll, but implicitly assumes the regulator to have perfect
information on each hospital and its market environment. Most critically, he
needs to know the hospitals cost function.
This, however, is far from reality and causes serious problems for regulators
in practice. They usually do not know hospitalscost functions. Consequently
they are unable to determine rst best inducing prices. Instead, they have
to rely on other price mechanisms. Unfortunately, the literature of health
economics is of little use in this quest and points to regulatory economics,
namely Shleifers (1985) yardstick competition. This is a method for regulating
rms whose costs functions are unknown to the regulator, but whose cost levels
are observable. The main goal of this regulation is to make it impossible for
the regulated rm to inuence its own price. This is done by reimbursing the
regulated rm with a price that reects the costs of an identical twin of this
rm. Thereby the regulator can induce an indirect competition between the
regulated company and its yardstick. The Nash equilibrium can result in rst
best outcomes.
In the light of the discussion on hospital regulation, Shleifers (1985) paper
has some important shortcomings, though, because it neglects some key fea-
tures of the hospital market. First, Shleifer does not incorporate endogenous
quality of care. Second, unlike the customers in Shleifers model, patients do
not pay prices for medical treatment.
This is where my paper picks up. I link together the two strands of litera-
ture, the health economics side and the regulatory economics side, by merging
the two decisive papers in the respective elds, namely Mas (1994) multitask
agent model and Shleifers (1985) yardstick competition. Specically, I take
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Mas multitask agent model, specify the regulators information set the way
this is typically done in the discussion among practitioners, and then apply
the yardstick competition regulation rule. The aim is to see whether yardstick
competition is really applicable in the specic hospital sector.
I nd that Shleifers results do not persist in this environment. In particu-
lar, hospitals will set quality equal to zero in response to pricing a la Shleifer.
The intuition for this result is the following. Since the demand response to
quality is the only incentive for hospitals to provide high quality, hospitals
need to receive positive mark-ups per patient. In the Nash equilibrium of
the indirect competition induced by a yardstick regulation, the mark-ups are,
however, zero. It turns out that a simpler version of yardstick competition
performs better, though not perfectly.3
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the related lit-
erature other than Ma (1994) and Shleifer (1985). Section 1.3 introduces the
models basics. Section 1.4 briey summarizes Mas model, but draws a di¤er-
ent conclusion than Ma, namely that under the restrictions of the regulators
information set it is a very di¢ cult task to determine optimal prices. Section
1.5 reviews Shleifers model in its original form. Section 1.6 is the main part
of this paper. It introduces quality into yardstick competition. In response
to the results, section 1.7 proposes a simpler and more favorable pricing rule.
The paper then concludes with section 1.8.
1.2 Related Literature
1.2.1 Theoretic Literature
In the health economics literature most papers ignore the restrictions of the
regulators information set and his di¢ culties to determine prices. Instead,
authors concentrate more on the question whether a xed price per patient
3To the best of my knowledge there exists only one other paper, Tangeras (2002), that
discusses yardstick competiton when quality matters. This sentence, however, already ex-
hausts the similiarties to my paper. The reason is that Tangeras denes yardstick competi-
tion in a much broader sense and asks a more general question, namely whether it is useful
to use other rmsreports on cost functions to evaluate whether the cost function that the
regulated rm i reports is reasonable. Since this is also done under CoSR, Tangerasresults
do not help in answering the more specic question we are dealing with in this paper.
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generally leads to too low quality provision within a DRG. In addition to Ma
and Shleifer, the following authors have contributed especially valuable insights
to the discussion on PPS:
The quality issue was rst considered by Ellis and McGuire (1986). They
argue that as prices in the PPS are x, it is protable for hospitals to reduce
quality of treatment if quality is costly. This result is formally derived in a
model where each patient is locked-in to his physician. They suggest that a
mixed reimbursement system (xed price component and a cost based vari-
able component) is superior to pure PPS. Ellis and McGuire assume e¢ cient
production as well as patient homogeneity, and do not model competition, or
hospital heterogeneity.
In contrast to this, Pope (1989) o¤ers a model of competition under a
PPS, where identical hospitals choose quality and degree of managerial slack.
In the symmetric Cournot equilibrium, competition (in quantity, by setting
quality) does not only reduce managerial slack (i.e. increase e¢ ciency), but
also increases quality. The intuition is that expanding quantity by increasing
quality is protable. Pope concludes that a mixed reimbursement system may
be better in situations where there is little competition. When competition
is very strong, quality may be excessive. This can, however, be mitigated by
reducing the price. His equilibrium concept requires complete symmetry of the
rms. He does not analyze the price setting.
Dranove (1987) is the rst to distinguish severity of cases within a DRG.
He points out that there may be e¢ ciency e¤ects due to specialization. These
e¤ects may be positive as well as negative. He considers two types of hospitals
in a given DRG - an e¢ cient type and an ine¢ cient type. Furthermore, he
assumes that patients within a DRG vary in the costs they cause. At given
price, ine¢ cient hospitals may stop treating patients, while e¢ cient ones con-
tinue to treat - an e¢ ciency enhancing specialization. If hospitals can forecast
the costs a specic patient will cause, they may engage in dumping (treat the
relatively cheap patients and turn down the costly ones) - an e¢ ciency decreas-
ing specialization. Dranove does not take into account quality of treatment
and competition among hospitals.
Ellis (1998) points out that the degree of competition for patients within
one DRG may be ambiguous when travel costs are present (horizontal di¤eren-
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tiation) and patientsseverity of illness varies (vertical di¤erentiation). In this
case, low severity patients are those who are (relatively) unwilling to travel
great distances. Each hospital is then a local monopolist for low severity pa-
tients. Since under PPS hospitals receive a xed price for this DRG and since
low severity patients o¤er a greater margin, hospitals will generally oversupply
services (creaming) in order to extend demand. High severity patients on the
other side are willing to travel great distances. Hospitals are therefore au-
tomatically competitors for those. Since high severity patients are, however,
less protable, hospitals will try to not treat ("dump") or at least underpro-
vide services for them ("skimp"). Since no reimbursement system is able to
take travel costs and di¤erences in severity of illness for each single patient
into account (due too informational and complexity problems), no regulation
scheme can hope to achieve neither rst nor second best outcomes. Ellis argues
that a mixed reimbursement system may nevertheless be superior to both, a
pure cost-of-service system and a pure PPS, for the same reasons as stated
in Ellis and McGuire (1986). Ellis assumes e¢ cient production and complete
symmetry of hospitals.
1.2.2 Empirical Literature
The empirical literature is vast, has to ght with serious structural problems,
and delivers mixed results. The biggest obstacle for empirical researchers is
that the key variables (cost reduction e¤orts, quality of care and hospital cost
functions) in hospital markets are unobservable. The lack of observations and
the corresponding reliance on imperfect proxies of the important factors make
econometric research in this eld a very di¢ cult task and vulnerable to an
innity of objections. The incomplete list of contributions reported here is
mainly drawn from Chalkley and Malcomson (2000).
Among the pioneers in assessing the cost saving e¤ects of a switch from
CoSR to PPS are Freiman et al. (1989), Frank and Lave (1989), Newhouse and
Byrne (1988) and Ellis and McGuire (1996). They report that the length of
stay in hospitals (the most commonly used proxy for resource usage) declines
in response to a change to PPS. Among the many criticisms of this proxy, the
most severe one is that length of stay is inuenced by large number of factors.
This is demonstrated by e.g. DesHarnais et al. (1987) and Miller and Sulvetta
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(1995), the latter attributing 69 % of costs to exogenous factors.
The quality e¤ects of a switch in regulation has recently received increasing
attention, but su¤ers a lot from the lack of reliable, objective quality measure-
ments. The most frequently used variable are mortality rates. This is a very
crude and relatively inelastic measure of quality, because only a small number
of patients is so severely ill that a low quality of care will cause them to die.
Even among those patients the results are mixed, though. DesHarnais et al.
(1987, 1990) nd no change in mortality rates in reaction to a change to PPS.
Cutler (1995), on the other side, observes no change in the overall rate, but
in the timing of mortality. An alternative measure for quality are treatment
numbers. The results by Hodgkin and McGuire (1994) indicate a decline in
treatment numbers. This could be due to dumping of costly patients, transfer
of patients to non-PPS institutions or reduced quality. Another study by Ellis
and McGuire (1996) provides evidence that 40% of reduction in length of stay
is due to reduced care intensity, while 60% is due to other aspects of quality
or e¤ort.
1.3 The Model Primitives
To simplify matters, I will consider hospitals that produce only one DRG (one-
product rm). Furthermore, I assume patients to be homogenous.
1.3.1 Costs
Since the regulator is interested in a long-term regulation scheme, I will pro-
ceed in my analysis by considering the long-run cost curves of hospitals. In
the long-run, all treatment costs are variable costs that depend on the quality
of treatment q and on cost reducing e¤orts e. Additionally, there will be some
costs of quality-increasing and cost-reducing e¤orts, E(e; q). The interpreta-
tion of the variables is the following: The quality of treatment q consists of
intensity of care, qualication of the doctors and nurses, available technical
equipment, e¤ectiveness of medication, etc. Cost reducing e¤ort e is mainly
organizational e¤ort that incorporates e¤ort to optimize the length of a pa-
tients stay in hospital, setting incentives to use the cheapest medication for
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given quality, design of e¢ cient wages for employees, monitoring of employ-
ees, organization of work ows, etc. Marginal costs c(q; e) are all observable
long-run marginal costs of running a hospital, i.e. mainly wages, expenditures
for technical equipment, maintenance costs of buildings, payments for electric-
ity and water, etc. E(e; q) are those costs of the residual claimant of prots
(chief doctor, administration, local municipality, management, shareholders of
private hospital) that he bears for e.g. designing incentive compatible wage
contracts for the employees, monitoring the employees, organization (duration
of stay of patients, ...), optimizing the work ow in the hospital, etc. We will
make the following assumptions on the cost function of hospital i:
Ci(qi; ei) = c(qi; ei)Di(qi) + E(qi; ei) (1.1)
where:
1. Structural Assumptions:
 The functional forms of c() and E() are the same for all hospitals
i = 1; :::; n. This is a simplication which is based upon the hy-
pothesis that in the long run all hospitals have access to the same
production technology.
 The demand function Di(qi) is di¤erent for each hospital and in-
creasing with quality. This assumption captures the heterogeneity
of hospitals, as for example the di¤erences in market environments
and sizes between metropolitan and rural area hospitals. See next
section for a detailed discussion.
 cqi() > 0; cqiqi() > 0, cei() < 0, ceiei > 0, cqiei  0
 For all markets i, Diqi(qi) > 0 and Diqiqi(qi) < 0 is assumed.
 c(qi; ei)Di(qi) is assumed to be a convex function
 Eqi() > 0; Eqiqi() > 0; Eei() > 0, Eeiei() > 0, Eqiei()  0
2. Informational Assumptions:
 ei is unobservable4
4For a discussion of the empirical observability of e and q see e.g. Chalkley and Mal-
comson (2000).
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 qi is unveriable for the regulator, but observable by local doctors
such that it inuences demand (see next section for a detailed dis-
cussion)
 The total levels c(qi; ei); E(qi; ei) and Di(qi) are veriable by the
regulator.
 The functional forms of Di(qi) are known to the regulator, but not
the ones of c(qi; ei) or E(qi; ei).5
1.3.2 Demand
Due to the insurance principle in health care, patients do not bear any direct
costs of treatment. This creates a moral hazard problem on the demand side:
Patients will seek the best treatment quality and intensity possible, without
taking into account the costs they cause.6 Therefore, demand depends mostly
on quality of care.
Typically, ordinary people are, however, unable to judge quality of treat-
ment, because medical care is a highly sophisticated product. In order to
decide what hospital to visit, prospective patients have to rely upon sources
of information and advice other than their own judgement.
It is therefore a reasonable working hypothesis to assume that a patient
chooses the hospital for treatment that is recommended to him by his physi-
cian (Hausarzt).7 What does a physician base his recommendation upon?
Considering him a reasonably good agent of his patient, he suggests the hos-
pital that he thinks will deliver the best care. In how far is a physician able to
judge the quality of care in a given hospital? Like the regulator, a physician
will have signicant di¢ culties to evaluate the quality of care in all hospitals
in Germany. It seems sensible, though, to assume that he has superior (to
5Estimating hospital cost functions is a very di¢ cult task. Some of the most evident
problems are unobservable case mix variations, output measurement in aggregates, uncer-
tainty of demand, di¢ culties in modelling hospital competition, etc. For a discussion of
these matters see e.g. Gaynor and Vogt (2000).
6The use of the term "moral hazard" in this context may be irritating for some reader.
It is, however, the typical expression for the observed behavior of fully insured patients,
who do not take the costs they cause into account. For a more detailed discussion see e.g.
Newhouse (2002), pp. 80-81.
7Quoting a German chief doctor: Our customers are, in fact, not the patients, but their
physicians.
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the regulator) knowledge about local hospitals with which he has been dealing
for quite a while. Therefore, as long as a patient chooses among local hos-
pitals, only, he is able to assess a hospitals quality fairly well and select the
one that yields him the highest utility8 For this reason it is a fair assumption
that demand of hospital i depends roughly on the quality of treatment in this
hospital, i.e. Di = Di(qi).
Own quality of care, however, is not the only determinant of own demand.
Usually, there is at least some degree of competition among hospitals - weak-
ened by transport costs, d, and individual preferences (which may be inde-
pendent of quality of care, such as e.g. design of the rooms, relatives working
or having been treated there, etc.). Hence, a more elaborate model of com-
petition would be desirable, specifying the individual hospitals competitive
environment and demand: Di = D(qi; qj; d). The methodological problem
with such a model is, however, that it implies the solution of reaction func-
tions, which is generally impossible without specifying functional forms of cost
functions - something that we want to avoid, since the nescience of the cost
functions is the origin of our quest.
For this reason, I base my analysis on a model of monopolistic competition
in which Di = Di(qi), dD
i(qi)
dqi
> 0, but varying in its functional forms over the
di¤erent hospitals i = 1; :::; n. Wherever necessary, I additionally provide a
model of competition to show that the results carry over.
1.4 Achievability of First Best
This section shows that a PPS can in principle achieve the rst best allocation
of quality and cost reduction e¤orts. In essence, it is simply a summary of the
key results of Albert Mas seminal (1994) paper. Going beyond Ma, however,
we want to analyze here what the regulator can achieve under the restrictions
we impose on his information set in the previous section. It turns out that
under these assumptions the authorities are incapable of determining the rst
best inducing prices.
8A number of econometric studies have established the close relationship between dis-
tance and patients hospital choice. In a recent study by Ho (2005) the author estimates
that if a hospital moves one additional mile away from a patients home this reduces the
probability that the patient chooses it by 21%.
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1.4.1 Benchmark First Best
The regulator seeks to maximize social welfare which is dened as
SW = W (qi)  c(qi; ei)Di(qi)  E(qi; ei) (1.2)
whereW (qi) is some function that measures consumer benets from quality,
Wqi(q
i) > 0. The rst order conditions are then given by:
qi;SO : Wqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)  c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.3)
ei;SO :   cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.4)
These equations are the benchmark for the performance of PPS.
1.4.2 Prospective Payment System
Under the prospective payment system a xed price, pi, is paid per patient,
that is independent of the hospitals own costs. Prots are therefore:
i(qi; ei) = piDi(qi)  c(qi; ei)Di(qi)  E(qi; ei) (1.5)
and the rst order conditions for the private optimum:
qi; : piDiqi(qi)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)  c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.6)
ei; :   cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.7)
Clearly the hospital exerts some cost-reducing e¤ort. What is more, this
is even the rst best e¤ort level, if qi; = qi;SO. The quality provision de-
pends, among other things, on the price the hospital receives. Proposition 1.1
summarizes the results.
Proposition 1.1 Under a prospective payment system the rst best e¤ort
level is induced if qi; = qi;SO. The quality level depends on the functions
c(qi; ei), cqi(), Eqi(), Diqi(qi) and price pi. The rst best level is induced if
pi =
Wqi (q
i)
Di
qi
(qi)

qi=qi;SO
.
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Thus, in principle, PPS can achieve the rst best allocation. That is Mas
(1994) conclusion. This is, however, an incomplete reading of proposition
1.1, because it says that the rst best allocation is achieved only if pi =
Wqi (q
i)
Di
qi
(qi)

qi=qi;SO
. This is an important detail, because qi;SO depends on the
functions c(qi; ei) and E(qi; ei), which are unknown to the regulator. He will
therefore be unable to evaluate the rst best inducing prices.9 If he sets the
wrong price, distortions may be great, even greater than under CoSR.
If a regulator wants to change to a PPS, he therefore has to nd a method
to compute welfare maximizing prices that does not require knowledge of the
hospitalsproduction function. Regulatory practice as well as the theoretic
literature relies upon Shleifers (1985) yardstick competition for a solution to
this problem. Unfortunately, Shleifers paper does not consider quality issues.
The next section reviews Shleifers original model. The section thereafter an-
alyzes the consequences of applying Shleifers yardstick competition in Mas
environment, i.e. when quality is endogenous and unveriable.
1.5 Yardstick Competition a la Shleifer
For those readers who are not familiar with yardstick competition this section
o¤ers a brief summary of Shleifers (1985) model in his original form. The
next section will then apply yardstick competition in the previously described
environment of Ma (1994).
1.5.1 Overview
In a general framework of local monopolists, Shleifer (1985) suggests to use
the costs of a (or several) comparable rm, a yardstick, to set the price for the
regulated rm. The three properties of his approach that make it appealing
for the regulation of hospitals are: (i) It does not matter whether the market
environments (especially the demand functions) of the regulated rms are dif-
ferent. (ii) Marginal cost pricing, where simply pi = cj is set and losses are
covered by a lump-sum transfer, achieves rst best production. (iii) Adjusted
9Not to mention the problems that the regulator usually has in computing Di() and
W (qi).
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average cost pricing, where the regulated rm is reimbursed as if it had the
same marginal and x costs as the yardstick, leads to second best production.
1.5.2 Marginal Cost Pricing
In our notation Shleifers argument works as follows. Prots are given by
i = (pi   c(ei))Di(pi)  E(ei) (1.8)
Suppose now that there is a set of identical rms j = 1; :::; n   1. Then
the regulator can induce i to produce e¢ ciently by setting the rms j as is
yardstick against which i has to compete. He does so by setting
pi = ci :=
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
c(ej)
and an extra transfer of
T i =
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
E(ej)
Prot maximization then yields:
max
ei
(ci   c(ei))Di(c(ej))  E(ei) + T i
)  cei(ei))Di(c(ej)) = Eei(ei)
Obviously, one interior symmetric Nash equilibrium is that both rms
choose the socially optimal ei;SO. It turns out that this is also unique.10
1.5.3 Adjusted Average Cost Pricing
In case that the regulator is unable to use lump-sum transfers, he can still
achieve second best outcomes by applying the following adjusted average pric-
ing scheme. Under T i = 0 the optimal allocation is characterized by the
10For the formal proof see pp. 322/323 in Shleifer (1985).
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following two equations:
 cei(ei)Di(pi) = Eei(ei) (1.9) 
pi   c(ei)Di(pi)  E(ei) = 0 (1.10)
The rst one equates marginal gain from cost reduction e¤ort to marginal
cost. The second one is the breakeven condition. The regulator can now
implement second best allocation by replacing c(ei) by c(ej) and E(ei) by
E(ej) in 1.10 and solve for pi. Under this price, rm is cost minimization
leads to the second best optimum.
1.6 Yardstick Competition in Presence of Com-
petition in Quality
Shleifers model does not capture some important characteristics of the hospital
market. First, patients do not pay prices for treatment. This implies that they
go where quality is highest. At the same time, quality cannot be veried by
the regulator. This means that he can steer it only via the prices he pays to
the hospitals.
It is the aim of this section to analyze to what extent these issues matter.
It turns out that they cause serious problems for yardstick competition. To
see this, consider Shleifers model under the assumptions made in section 1.3.
The hospitals prot function is then
i(qi; ei) = piDi(qi)  c(qi; ei)Di(qi)  E(qi; ei)
1.6.1 Marginal Cost Pricing
Under the marginal cost pricing rule of yardstick competition, hospitals are
reimbursed according to the following rule:
pi =
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
c(qj; ej) and T i =
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
E(qj; ej) (1.11)
Prots are then
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) i(qi; ei) =
 
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
c(qj; ej)  c(qi; ei)
!
Di(qi)
+
nX
j 6=i
1
n  1E(q
j; ej)  E(qi; ei) (1.12)
which leads to the rst order conditions
qi; :
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
c(qj; ej)Diqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)
 c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.13)
ei; :   cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.14)
The di¤erence to the rst best FOCs 1.3 and 1.4 is that here we have
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=i c(q
j; ej)Diqi(q
i) instead of Wqi(qi). How big this distortion is, can-
not be said without some more structure. The next sections show that the
distortions are tremendous.
Symmetric Hospitals
Suppose there are n hospitals. All have access to the same cost functions
and face identical demand functions. For the moment we neglect competition,
i.e. Di = Di(qi) instead of Di = Di(qi; qj). This facilitates the analysis
considerably and allows us to study general demand and cost functions. Later
we will also specify a more elaborate model of competition. Section 1.6.1 shows
that the following result also translates to more asymmetric environments.
Proposition 1.2 In the case of complete symmetry, marginal cost pricing that
follows yardstick competition leads to zero quality: qi; = 0. If furthermore
Di(qi = 0) = 0, then also ei; = 0.
Proof. If all hospitals are identical, all hospitals will get the same price
pi = pj = p. If all hospitals get the same price, the optimization problem is
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the same for all hospitals, yielding the same set of rst order conditions
qi;(p) : pDiqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)  c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei)(1.15)
ei;(p) :   cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.16)
It follows that all hospitals choose the same quality and e¤ort levels qi;(p) =
qj;(p) and ei;(p) = ej;(p). This implies that all of them will have the same
marginal cost levels c(qi;(p); ei;(p)) = c(qj;(p); ej;(p)). According to the
pricing rule pi = 1
n 1
Pn
j 6=i c(q
j; ej) this implies pi = p = c(qi;; ei;). Insert-
ing this into 1.15 yields  cqi(qi;; ei;)Di(qi;)   Eqi(qi ; ei ) = 0 which yields
the corner solution qi; = 0. Substituting this into 1.16 results in ei; = 0, if
Di(qi = 0) = 0.
The intuition for this result is that, in equilibrium, hospitals earn a zero
prot margin per patient. Then, however, no hospital has an interest in sus-
taining high reputation. Consequently, it provides zero quality. A more de-
tailed interpretation and discussion is given further below.
Symmetric Hospitals in Competition on a Salop Circle
The result of zero cost reduction e¤ort depends on the assumption Di(qi =
0) = 0. This may seem unrealistic, because patients may still prefer low (or
even zero) quality treatment in a hospital than no treatment at all. To see
how this changes the results, consider a model of quality competition among
hospitals on a Salop circle. On a Salop circle, which may as usual be thought
of as a city, there are n identical hospitals active, each facing marginal costs
ci(qi; ei) = qi   ei and e¤ort costs E(qi; ei) = (qi)2 + (ei)2. Consumers derive
utility u(qi) from being treated at hospital i. When yielding care from a
hospital, a patient does not have to pay prices, but incurs transportation costs
of d  distance. We assume uqi(qi) > 0, uqiqi(qi) < 0 and u(q = 0) > d to
assure that market is always covered, independent of the number of hospitals.
Marginal consumers ex are then characterized by
u(qi)  dex = u(qj)  d( 1
n
  ex) (1.17)
, ex = u(qi)  u(qj) + dn
2d
(1.18)
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which implies demand for hospital i of
Di(qi; qj) =
u(qi)  u(qj) + d
n
d
(1.19)
Under PPS his results in the optimization problem
max
ei;qi
i = (pi   qi + ei)u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
   qi2    ei2 + T i (1.20)
with the rst order conditions
qi; :   u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
+ (pi   qi + ei)uqi(q
i)
d
  2qi = 0 (1.21)
ei; :
u(qi)  u(qj) + d
n
d
  2ei = 0 (1.22)
which implies ei; = u(q
i) u(qj)+ d
n
2d
. Substituting this into 1.21 yields
 u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
+
 
pi   qi + u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
2d
!
uqi(q
i)
d
  2qi = 0 (1.23)
Due to the symmetry, we have pi = pj = p and qi = qj, from which follows
qi; :   1
n
+

p  qi + 1
2n

uqi(q
i)
d
  2qi = 0 (1.24)
ei; : ei; =
1
2n
(1.25)
The pricing rule pi = 1
n 1
Pn
j 6=i c(q
j; ej) implies also here p = c(qi;; ei;) =
qi;   1
2n
. This leads to the corner solution qi; = q = 0.
How does this compare to the social optimum? Welfare is given by
W = u(q)  q + e  q2n  ne2   d
4n
(1.26)
The rst order conditions are then:
qSO : uq(q)  1  2qn = 0 (1.27)
eSO : 1  2ne = 0 (1.28)
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In the social optimum we have therefore eSO = 1
2n
and qSO > 0 for given
n. The comparison is summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1.3 Let the number of hospitals be exogenously xed. If Di(qi =
0) > 0, the marginal cost pricing rule of yardstick competition potentially
achieves rst best cost reduction e¤ort, but leads to too low, namely zero, qual-
ity.
The intuition for this result is the following: As before, the hospital has
no incentive to increase its reputation and therefore chooses zero quality. But
it has an incentive to save on costs, because in equilibrium it gets an amount
of transfers that it cannot inuence (due to symmetric positive equilibrium
demand) - the typical yardstick competition e¤ect.
Remark 1.1 Recall that in this Salop example we had to make explicit as-
sumptions on the cost functions. In particular, the restrictions cqe = 0 and
Eqe() = 0 are important. It may seem more reasonable to assume cqe() > 0
and Eqe() > 0. This leaves the result of zero quality provision una¤ected,
but implies that then the cost reduction e¤ort level is distorted upwards, i.e.
too much weight is put on reducing costs - a typical result of multitask agent
models.
Asymmetric Hospitals
When hospitals di¤er from each other in market environments, then the ques-
tion is what rm(s) j 2 f1; :::; ng, j 6= i does the regulator take as a yardstick
for rm i? The only candidates are all those rms that have the same market
environments, because if other rms are taken, it is not guaranteed anymore
that the regulated rm yields nonnegative prots. Then, however we are back
at equations 1.15 and 1.16. which results in the same conclusion as stated in
propositions 1.2 and 1.3.
What do these results mean? Let us summarize what we have done up to
now to recall the context for these results. In the introduction we described
that the former regulation scheme of hospitals, simple reimbursement of cost
of service, does not give any incentives to save costs. As reaction, a regulatory
authority may want to switch to prospective payment systems to nance the
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hospitals. This scheme can in principle induce hospitals to produce rst best
e¤orts in quality as well as in cost control. This is possible if prices are set
correctly. In reality, however, the regulator has problems to determine these
optimal prices, because he does not know the hospitalscost functions. It is
commonly said that the way to bypass this problem is to use yardstick compe-
tition a la Shleifer, in particular the marginal cost pricing version discussed in
this section. Unfortunately, Shleifers mechanism does not take into account
some particularities of the hospital market. In this section of the paper we
do this, and propositions 1.2 and 1.3 show that if a regulator uses Shleifers
marginal cost pricing rule, hospitals will provide zero quality. The reason is
that they earn a zero prot margin per patient and therefore have no incentive
to compete for patients by setting high quality.
Is this realistic? Will this happen? Not quite, probably, because, most of
all, doctors may have motives other than prot maximization. In particular,
they may be driven by altruism or fear of law suits. It is therefore more
likely that quality will be driven down to some minimum level. The basic
logic, however, remains the same. We conclude, therefore, that a prospective
payment system, where the marginal cost pricing rule of yardstick competition
is used, generally leads to too low, in the extreme, zero, quality of service and
to a cost reduction e¤ort level of e 7 eSO (depending on Di(qi = 0) and cqe()
as well as Eqe()).
Since the reason for this result lies in the marginal cost pricing, it is a
natural question to ask whether the average cost pricing scheme of yardstick
competition can do any better. This is subject of the next section.
1.6.2 Adjusted Average Cost Pricing
The average cost pricing version of yardstick competition demands the regu-
lator to take for each hospital i at least one twin j and set pi such that the
following condition is fullled:
i(qi; ei) = piDi(qi)  1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
c(qj; ej)Di(qi)  1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
E(qj; ej) = 0
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, pi =
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=i c(q
j; ej)Di(qi) + 1
n 1
Pn
j 6=iE(q
j; ej)
Di(qi)
(1.29)
We observe that price is larger than marginal costs. This suggests that the
problems we have with marginal costs, as described in section 1.6.1, are not
present here. But there is another one: Here pi depends on the own choice
of qi, namely decreasingly in qi. This is detrimental to the idea of yardstick
competition:
Proposition 1.4 In presence of Cournot competition via quality, the average
cost pricing scheme of yardstick competition does not make own price indepen-
dent of own decisions, anymore: pi = pi(qi).
This results in signicant distortions as we shall demonstrate now.
The rst order conditions of the hospitals maximization problem are:
qi; : piqi(q
i)D(qi) + piDiqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi) (1.30)
 c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.31)
ei; :  cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei)
Average cost pricing a la Shleifer implies two opposing price e¤ects. One,
piDiqi(q
i), works quality increasing and is the desired e¤ect of any prospective
payment system. The other one, piqi(q
i)D(qi), stems from the adjustment of js
costs to is demand environment. As described in proposition 1.4, this e¤ect
is negative. Inserting 1.29 for pi yields:
qi; :  
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=iE(q
j; ej)
Di(qi)
Diqi(q
i)
+
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=i c(q
j; ej)Di(qi) + 1
n 1
Pn
j 6=iE(q
j; ej)
Di(qi)
Diqi(q
i)
 cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)  c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.32)
ei; :  cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei)
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Analogously to the proof of proposition 1.2, under symmetry we have
c(qi;(p); ei;(p)) = c(qj;(p); ej;(p)). It follows:
qi; :  cqi(qi;; ei;)Di(qi;)  Eqi(qi;; ei;) = 0 (1.33)
ei; :  cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.34)
The result is completely analogous to the preceding section on marginal
cost pricing and is summarized in proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.5 In the case of complete symmetry, average cost pricing a la
Shleifer (1985) leads to zero quality: qi; = 0. If furthermore Di(qi = 0) = 0,
then also ei; = 0.
The reason for this zero quality result is that the two e¤ects of an increase
in quality, namely increase in demand and decrease in price, exactly outweigh
each other.
The next section shows that the zero quality result also holds in a strategic
competitive environment, but that cost reduction e¤ort may be optimal.
Symmetric Hospitals in Competition on a Salop Circle
We will use the same Salop model as in the section on marginal cost pricing.
The only di¤erence is that now the pricing scheme is di¤erent. Here, however,
the hospital can a¤ect its own price:
max
ei;qi
i = (pi(qi)  qi + ei)u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
   qi2    ei2
qi; : (piqi(q
i)  1)u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
+ (pi(qi)  qi + ei)uqi(q
i)
d
(1.35)
 2qi = 0 (1.36)
ei; :
u(qi)  u(qj) + d
n
d
  2ei = 0
Chapter 1 - Yardstick Competition 34
Following Shleifers pricing rule we have pi(qi) =
(qj ej)Di(qi)+(qi)2+(ei)2
Di(qi)
and
piqi(qi) =
 ((qi)2+(ei)2)D0i(qi)
(Di(qi))2
. Additionally, Di(qi) = u(q
i) u(qj)+ d
n
d
. Inserting this
yields:
qi; :
 ((qi)2 + (ei)2)uqi (q
i)
d
u(qi) u(qj)+ d
n
d
  u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
+
0@(qj   ej)u(qi) u(qj)+ dnd + (qi)2 + (ei)2
u(qi) u(qj)+ d
n
d
  qi + ei
1A uqi(qi)
d
  2qi = 0
ei; :
u(qi)  u(qj) + d
n
d
  2ei = 0
This simplies to:
qi; :  u(q
i)  u(qj) + d
n
d
+ (qj   ej)u
i
qi(q
i)
d
  qi + ei uqi(qi)
d
  2qi = 0
ei; :
u(qi)  u(qj) + d
n
d
  2ei = 0
Due to the symmetry we have pi = pj = p, ei = ej and qi = qj, from which
follows
qi; :   1
n
  2qi = 0) qi; = 0
ei; :
1
n
  2ei = 0, ei; = 1
2n
Recall that the social optimum is determined by
qSO : uq(q)  1  2qn = 0 (1.37)
eSO : eSO =
1
2n
(1.38)
Obviously, cost reduction e¤ort is provided in the socially optimal amount,
but quality is zero and therewith suboptimal:
Proposition 1.6 If D(qi = 0) > 0 and additionally cqe() = 0 and Eqe() = 0,
then the average cost pricing rule of yardstick competition achieves rst best
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cost reduction e¤ort, but leads to too low, namely zero, quality.
1.6.3 Summary
In this section we have analyzed what happens if yardstick competition a la
Shleifer (1985) is applied in the specic market environment of the hospital
sector. We have shown that it always leads to zero quality provision. If
additionally D(qi = 0) = 0, cqe() 6= 0 or Eqe() 6= 0, then also cost reduction
e¤orts are at an ine¢ cient level. For the practice of regulation this means that
a regulator, who changes to a prospective payment system and uses yardstick
competition as his method to compute prices, introduces signicant distortions
into the system. He cannot be sure that he improves the health care system
at all. Instead he may even worsen it.
1.7 A Simple Renement of Yardstick Com-
petition
We have seen that yardstick competition à la Shleifer leads to zero quality
provision. The question is whether yardstick competition can be rened and
improved in some way. Indeed this is the case, but only to a certain extend.
Recall that a regulator has to choose completely identical hospitals as yard-
sticks to ensure nonnegative prots. Then, however, he can use simple average
cost pricing pi = ACj instead of the adjusted average cost pricing rule that
Shleifer proposes. The advantage is that then price is independent of own
action and larger than marginal costs. This results in strictly positive quality
provision:
qi; : piDiqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi)  c(qi; ei)Diqi(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei) (1.39)
ei; :  cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei) (1.40)
Inserting pi = ACj and using the symmetry argument, i.e. c(qi;(p); ei;(p)) =
c(qj;(p); ej;(p)), yields:
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qi; :
E(qj; ej)
Dj(qj)
Diqi(q
i)  cqi(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eqi(qi; ei)
ei; :  cei(qi; ei)Di(qi) = Eei(qi; ei)
which has, in principle, an interior solution.
Proposition 1.7 Simple average cost pricing, pi = ACj, where hospital j is
an identical twin to hospital i, leads to positive quality provision.
We can, however, not say much more about the level of quality provided.
It can be everything: just right, too low, or even too high. If furthermore,
the cross-derivatives of c(qi; ei) or E(qi; ei) are non-zero, also cost reduction
e¤ort is distorted. Summing up, even under this rened version of yardstick
competition, a prospective payment system may harm a health system more
than it helps.
1.8 Conclusion
The dominating opinion in the literature is that, as regulatory scheme for the
hospital market, a prospective payment system is superior to cost of service
regulation. The arguments put forward are that, rst, PPS gives higher in-
centives for cost savings. Second, reputation e¤ects will force the hospitals to
provide high levels of quality.
This chapter argues that this judgement is incomplete, because it ignores
informational limitations of the regulator. The level of quality provided de-
pends crucially on the prices set. In practice, however, the regulator proves
unable to determine optimal prices. Therefore, unless a suitable second best
pricing mechanism is found, PPS may even worsen the performance of the
health care sector.
The pricing mechanism suggested in the literature is Shleifers yardstick
competition. Shleifer does not consider quality, though. It was the aim of this
chapter to understand, whether yardstick competition really is applicable to
the hospital market. The analysis yields the following objections:
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First, yardstick competition in this environment requires the regulator to
use only rms as yardsticks that are identical to the regulated rm even in
demand. Second, it is shown that even if all necessary information can be
inferred and an identical twin can be found for each rm, yardstick competition
à la Shleifer will lead to zero quality provision. Third, a simpler version of
yardstick competition average cost pricing can lead to positive quality and
cost reduction e¤ort. Even then, however, quality can be too low or even
excessive depending on the individual market environments. Furthermore, if
cost functions exhibit non-negative cross derivatives, the distortions in quality
will also lead to too low or too strong cost reduction e¤ort.
Chapter 2
Smoking Ban in Taverns:
Increase in Welfare or
Illegitimate Market
Intervention?
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"To the best of my knowledge we live in a so called free market economy.
If it is in the interest of a bartender to prohibit smoking in his establishment,
then there is nothing you could object. But this should not be imposed from
above."
"I believe that every bartender shall be allowed to run his bar as he likes.
If the public - and not only some grumblers - had an interest in non-smoker
bars, those would spring up like mushrooms."
[Translations of stated opinions in a forum on "General Ban of Smoking in
Bars and Restaurants" by Die Zeit Online in Fall 2005]
"If a smoking ban were good for taverns, competition alone would already
lead to the rst smoke-free pubs."
[Translation of a quote of Klaus Uwe Benneter, former general secretary of
the German Social Democratic Party, Spiegel Online, June 20th 2006.]
2.1 Introduction
The U.S., Ireland, England, Scotland, Sweden, Spain, Italy and India are
examples of countries that have strict smoking laws, including smoking bans
in restaurants, bars, and discotheques.1 In other countries, e.g. Germany,
smoking bans are not present, but controversially discussed. Unsurprisingly,
this debate is typically a very emotional one, because the motives are very
strong: Non-smokers su¤er from the bad air and see their health threatened.
Smokers, on the other side, see their freedom of choice in danger. Both parties
have sound economic arguments on their sides. Non-smokers clearly su¤er from
a negative externality in a pub when other customers smoke. They believe to
have a right of clean air and demand protection by the government. Smokers,
on the contrary, claim the right to air pollution for themselves and emphasize
their right of pursuit of happiness. They point out that non-smokers do not
need to enter a pub. If they do nevertheless, they should tolerate the smoke.
After all, they say, if it were in the interest of the gross of customers, bars
would prohibit smoking themselves.
1In this paper no di¤erences are made between restaurants, bars, pubs, discotheques,
etc. Therefore we can use these terms interchangeably.
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Who is right in this dispute? Does the free market achieve the best solution
or is there a case for governmental intervention? This is the key question that
any legislation needs to answer before deciding in favor or against a general ban
of smoking - a decision with far-reaching economic, health, legal and emotional
consequences for millions of people every day.
Where to start? In essence, the question we are dealing with here is a classic
social cost problem a la Coase (1960). The hitch is that the transaction costs
are so high that the Coase Theorem does not apply. Or, as Phelps (1992, p.
430) states it: "Trying to use agreements [...] between people in a restaurant to
determine whether smoking would take place would be the height of absurdity,
and nobody would think seriously of a full "property rights" approach to such
a problem. The transaction costs of reaching agreements would overwhelm the
problem."
Nevertheless a lot of people, as the introductory citations show, argue di-
rectly or indirectly with Coase to justify their claim that the free market yields
the best outcome. This line of argumentation is put into economic terms by
Tollison and Wagner (1992), Lee (1991), Boyes and Marlow (1996), Dunham
and Marlow (2000, 2003, 2004) and proceeds the following way. For the Coase
Theorem to work, two conditions need to hold. First, property rights must be
clearly assigned. This condition is fullled, because the air space in a private
pub or restaurant belongs to the owner of the establishment. Second, trans-
action costs must be zero. Also this condition is fullled, the above authors
argue, because the establishment owner acts as intermediary between smokers
and non-smokers. He internalizes the externalities by allocating the air space
to smokers and non-smokers according to prot maximization. In other words:
If it is in the interest of the customers, bar owners would prohibit smoking.
Governmental intervention is therefore unnecessary.
While this argumentation sounds reasonable, it seems, however, to be at
odds with reality. In Germany there are about 240.000 pubs, cafés and restau-
rants. Only 800 of them are non-smoker locations.2 In contrast to this, 76 %
of Germans are smokers.3 In this light, it is di¢ cult to believe that the market
2These numbers are taken from the article "Freiwillige Verpichtungen wirken nicht"
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, August 20th, 2006) by Michael Krzyanowski, unit
head of the German o¢ ce of the World Health Organization.
3People who smoke daily in percentage of people 15 years or older. Source: Organisation
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internalizes all externalities and works e¢ ciently. Unfortunately, none of the
authors, who claim that prot maximization internalizes the externalities from
smoking, provides a formal model that could help to solve this apparent con-
tradiction. To the best of my knowledge there does not exist one single model
in the literature that deals with this problem. It is the aim of this paper to
ll this gap and provide the discussion, politics and econometricians with a
stringent model for further progress.
In what follows, a model of competition between pubs (or restaurants,
cafés, discotheques, etc.) is built. Consumers go to pubs for consumption
of beverages as well as for social reasons. It is shown that pub owners do
internalize externalities from smoking, but in a way that is not always benecial
to consumers. Specically, negative externalities from smoking allow rms to
charge higher prices. Consequently, choosing to allow smoking can be used as
a collusive device. As a result, prot maximization and welfare maximization
can lead to completely di¤erent results. There are reasonable parameter values
for which pubs choose to allow smoking, although it is in the public interest to
prohibit it. The arguments against smoking bans stated above are therefore
false. Market failure may very well be present and governmental intervention
may be justied. The nal answer to the question whether to ban smoking or
not is an empirical one.
2.2 Related Literature
While there is a lot of literature on smoking in general, its health e¤ects and
tobacco taxation, there are only a few papers on the question whether smoking
should be banned in restaurants, bars, etc. Furthermore, many of those works
are purely verbal. To the best of my knowledge there exists no paper that
o¤ers a formal theoretic model. There are, however, a few empirical studies.
Dunham and Marlow (2000) analyze the data from a 1996 U.S. nationwide
telephone survey, which consists of owners/managers of randomly selected 650
restaurants and 650 bars. They are asked for their estimation of revenue
changes due to stricter smoking laws. The key results are that 39% of the
restaurant owners expect a decrease in prots and 51% expect no changes.
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005).
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Dunham and Marlow (2003) use a survey conducted in 2001 in Wisconsin.
The survey consists of 550 owners of restaurants and 428 owners of bars. The
restaurants are di¤erentiated according to whether they are already subject
to governmental smoking restrictions or not. The owners were asked whether
they expect or experienced prot decreases in response to stricter smoking laws.
38% of restaurant owners experienced a decrease in prots, and 50% reported
no change. 81% of bar owners expected/experienced a decrease in prots, 13%
responded with "no change". Furthermore, the survey contains information on
changes in other parameters (prices, promotions, entertainment, opening hours
and benets to workers). 20 % of restaurant owners already subject to smoking
restrictions reported that restrictions caused them to raise prices, while 22%
introduced promotions. In the other two categories 30-35% reported price
increases and the same percentage replied with "introduce promotions". The
authors leave unclear, however, what exactly is meant by promotions. Since
promotions typically include o¤ering discounts and free trials, promotions can
imply lowering prices. The overall price e¤ect seems, therefore, to remain
ambiguous.
Dunham and Marlow (2004) use the same data as in their 2003 paper to
explore whether restaurant owners adapt to the needs of their customers. Run-
ning an OLS-regression for restaurants not subject to governmental restriction
(smoking bans or minimum non-smoker seating requirement), the following
variables have a signicantly positive inuence on the share of non-smoking
seating: Share of customers with white collar jobs, share of customers with
children, being part of a chain and number of seats. The factors that have
a signicantly negative e¤ect are share of customers being smokers, having a
general liquor license and age of establishment. Dunham and Marlow conclude
from this that without any governmental restrictions restaurant owners adapt
to the interests of their customers. Running the same regression for restaurants
subject to governmental restrictions, there remains only one variable with a
signicant inuence, namely the share of smokers among customers. From
this drop in signicance levels the authors infer that governmental restric-
tions overturns all other factors of seating allocation and prevents diversity
in the market. This result is neither surprising nor relevant from a welfare
perspective, though. If the government prohibits smoking in bars, individual
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di¤erences in treating smokers and non-smokers are leveled by denition. It is
also clear that welfare optimality implies product di¤erentiation among pubs,
and that therewith a general smoking ban cannot be welfare optimal. The
real question is, however, whether a stricter regulation improves welfare in
comparison to the free market outcome or not.
2.3 A Model of the Market
It seems obvious that the driving force of a pubs demand is of social nature.
People usually go to a pub to enjoy the specic atmosphere, which consists
to a high degree of the other visitors. This feature of tavern demand is best
captured as network e¤ects. A customer of a bar benets from the presence of
other customers.4
Furthermore, we have to distinguish two groups of customers: smokers
and non-smokers. Customers from each side benet from the presence of all
other customers at a given pub, independently of what side they stem from.
Non-smokers, however, su¤er also negative externalities from smokerstobacco
consumption. The model setting that I use to capture these e¤ects resembles
the two-sided market framework a la Armstrong (2004). The market, however,
is not two-sided, in the sense that the bar owners cannot price di¤erentiate
between the two groups. Let us discuss these issues in more detail.
2.3.1 Consumers
Suppose that the two groups of customers, smokers and non-smokers, are each
distributed on a Hotelling line. Non-smokers are all identical and uniformly
distributed on the unit interval with mass Nns. Also smokers are all identical
and uniformly distributed on the unit interval, but are of mass Ns.
4Not everybody may agree with this view. I am sure that also the reader of this note
has experienced an evening in a restaurant or a bar during which she was so annoyed by the
neighbouring table that she regreted her choice of bar. In general, however, I believe that
most of us in most instances enjoy the social atmosphere in a pub. After all, who would go
to an empty pub? One may just as well stay home and have a beer there.
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2.3.2 Bars
There are two pubs competing for customers. Pub A is situated at the begin-
ning of the unit interval (x=0) and pub B at the end (x=1). The di¤erentiation
parameter t (the same for both groups) can therefore be interpreted as a taste
parameter, as a distance parameter or some combination of the two. Firms
are prot maximizers that set prices and can choose whether they allow smok-
ing or prohibit it. Firms can, however, not price discriminate between the two
market sides. Consequently, the price rm i sets is the same for both consumer
groups. Both rms incur the same constant marginal costs c per unit provision
of consumption goods.
2.3.3 Utility
Each consumer (no matter whether he is smoker or non-smoker) has unit de-
mand for consumption.5 Suppose that if he consumes this unit in a bar instead
of at home, this yields extra utility uns if he is a non-smoker and us if he is a
smoker.6 Additionally, each consumer derives utility  from the company of
every other customer in the same pub.7
Moreover, each smoker smokes (if he is allowed to at the place where he
consumes) some amount of tobacco which produces a unit amount of smoke,
but also yields him some extra net utility of s (net the production costs incurred
by the tobacco company8). For simplicity, let us assume that a smoker smokes
in a smoker pub only.9 If he goes to a non-smoker bar or stays at home, I
assume, he does not smoke.10
5This may be thought of as a bundle of foods and drinks which is assumed to be the
same for all customers.
6I use di¤erent utility indices to allow for potential positive correlations between being a
smoker and enjoying evening entertainment - a claim that some readers may want to make.
7Some readers may object that a pub visitor derives his main social benet from the
friends whom together with he goes out. The model can incorporate this by interpreting
each potential consumer as a group instead of a single customers, whose outside option
(staying at home) is normalized to zero.
8We use utility from smoking net the production costs, because this allows us to ignore
tobacco companies in the welfare analysis. See the next subsection for details.
9This allows us to normalize the outside option to zero, but has no e¤ect on the results.
10A di¤erent interpretation is that at those places he has to go outside to smoke - some-
thing most smokers do also at home. In this sense s can be interpreted as the utility of not
having to leave the bar.
One may just as well assume that smokers smoke also inside their appartments. This does
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Each non-smoker, however, su¤ers from each unit of smoke a utility loss of e
(negative externality of smoking).11 Note that this translates into a reduction
of the positive network e¤ects that a non-smoker has from smokers in a pub
in which smoking is allowed.
Suppose that each consumer can choose whether he goes to pub A or to
pub B or stays home. Additionally, each smoker will smoke if he is allowed to.
Gross utilities are therefore given by
 for a non-smoker:
Uns =
8><>:
uns + (n
i
nsNns + n
i
sNs)  pi if he goes to a non-smoker bar
uns + n
i
nsNns + (  e)nisNs   pi if he goes to a smoker bar
0 if he stays home
(2.1)
 for a smoker:
Us =
8><>:
us + (n
i
nsNns + n
i
sNs)  pi if he goes to a non-smoker bar
us + s+ (n
i
nsNns + n
i
sNs)  pi if he goes to a smoker bar
0 if he stays home
(2.2)
where nil is the fraction of market side l 2 fns; sg that rm i 2 fA;Bg
captures and pi the price at pub i for the unit amount of consumption the
price that each consumer has to pay for the same unit bundle when he stays
at home.12 Note that the value of the outside option is normalized to zero.
2.3.4 Tobacco Companies
To simplify the model, tobacco companies are neglected throughout this paper.
This is motivated by the following assumptions. First, the tobacco companies
not a¤ect the analysis in a signicant way and leaves the general results unchanged. It only
raises the outside option for the smokers and therefore makes their participation constraint
more restrictive.
11Due to the laws of di¤usion and the Brownian Motion tobacco smoke spreads evenly
in the air space surrounding the source of smoke. It therefore takes by nature the form of
negative network externalities.
12I dene gross utility as utility excluding transportation costsand net utility as utility
including them.
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cannot directly inuence the market for pubs and therefore act unstrategi-
cally.13 Second, the utility from smoking s is net the production costs that the
tobacco companies incur by producing this unit of consumed tobacco. Third,
prices paid by the consumers are directly transferred to the tobacco companies.
Since the tobacco companies also enter the welfare function, the welfare e¤ect
of smoking or not smoking is reduced to the net utility s per consumer.
2.3.5 Timing of the Game and Structure of the Chapter
The structure of the game is the following:
1. stage: The legislation decides whether to allow smoking or to impose a
general smoking ban in bars, restaurants, etc.
2. stage: If smoking is allowed, rms decide whether to allow or prohibit
smoking in their establishment. Both rms observe the respective other
rms decision. If at the rst stage a smoking ban is imposed, the second
stage does not apply.
3. stage: Both establishments simultaneously choose their prices.
4. stage: Consumers observe the prices and decide to which pub they go.
5. stage: Payo¤s are realized.
As usual, the game will be solved by backwards induction. Five subgames
have therefore to be distinguished. Two pairs of them are completely symmet-
ric and can thus be treated as one. First, smoking is allowed by both pubs
(section 2.4). Second, smoking is prohibited by law or by both pubs volun-
tarily (section 2.5). Third, pub i allows smoking and pub j prohibits smoking
(section 2.7). Comparison of the welfare of cases 1 and 2 yields a condition
under which a smoking ban is desirable (section 2.6). Comparison of prots
in case 1 and case 3 yields a condition under which it is not protable for
an establishment to prohibit smoking voluntarily (section 2.8). Solving these
13This is actually not quite right. As a former promoter of a cigarette producer told
me, pubs get signicant amounts of money by tobacco rms for placing ash-trays with the
respective logo on the tables and counters. Since this would only strengthen the point we
are going to make in this paper, we neglect it here for simplicity.
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two conditions simultaneously shows that there are reasonable combinations of
parameter ranges for which prohibition of smoking in both pubs is desirable,
but will not be provided voluntarily. Consequently, for these combinations of
parameter ranges, a general smoking ban is welfare increasing. Section 2.9
discusses the role of separate seating instead of complete bans. The paper
concludes in section 2.10.
2.3.6 Assumptions
Assumptions 1 and 2 guarantee concavity of prots in prices in all relevant
cases:
Assumption 1: t > NnsNs
Nns+Ns
e
Assumption 2: t > (Ns +Nns)
Assumption 3-9 are straightforward restrictions of the parameter values to
the space of positive real numbers:
Assumption 3-9: ; e; s;Nns; Ns; us; uns > 0
Assumption 10 ensures that markets are always covered in equilibrium:
Assumption 10: uns and us are su¢ ciently large to ensure that markets
are always covered.14
2.4 Status Quo - A and B as Smoker Pubs
I call the case in which both pubs allow smoking "status quo", because this is
what is observed in Germany at present.
Demand fractions nil can be found by determining the marginal consumer,
who is situated at point x and is indi¤erent between going to pub A or B:
UAl   txl = UBl   t(1  xl) (2.3)
, xl = 1
2
+
UAl   UBl
2t
(2.4)
Market shares are therefore
14The precise thresholds are tedious to calculate, because of the asymmetric case. Since
the precise thresholds are also irrelevant for the (theoretic) result of this paper, we can
content ourselves with assuming that the utility from going to a pub is so large that markets
are always covered. Stating the precise condition does not add any useful information.
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) nil =
1
2
+
U il   U jl
2t
(2.5)
Substituting the utilities from equations 2.1 and 2.2 into 2.5, taking into ac-
count that nil = 1 njl , and solving for nil yields the demand reaction functions
nil(n
i
m). Solving these simultaneously for the demand fractions yields:
nins =
1
2
+
(pj   pi)(t  eNs)
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns) + eNnsNs) (2.6)
nis =
1
2
+
(pj   pi)t
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns) + eNnsNs) (2.7)
Assumption 2 guarantees that the denominator of nil is non-zero.
Note that nins 6= nis if pj 6= pi. Suppose for example that pj > pi and
t > eNs, then rm i catches more than half of the smoker market. Then,
however, non-smokers su¤er more negative externalities there than in the high-
pricing pub. This drives some of them away. Consequently, the low-pricing
pub has fewer non-smokers than smokers. If e is very large, it is possible that
the market share on the non-smoker side even drops below 1=2. However, if
rms are symmetric - as we assume here - the outcome will be pj = pi and
therefore nins = n
i
s = n
j
ns = n
j
s =
1
2
.
Remembering that demand is demand fractions multiplied by the total
numbers of respective customers, prots are given by
i = (pi   c)ninsNns + (pi   c)nisNs (2.8)
Substituting 2.6 and 2.7 into this equation, we can rewrite prots as:
i = (pi   c)

1
2
+
(pj   pi)(t  eNs)
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns) + eNnsNs)

Nns
+ (pi   c)

1
2
+
(pj   pi)t
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns) + eNnsNs)

Ns (2.9)
which is quadratic in the price and concave under Assumption 1. We
can therefore di¤erentiate w.r.t. pi, set this equal to zero, solve for pi to get
the reaction functions. We solve these simultaneously and rearrange to get
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equilibrium prices
pi = c|{z}
costs
 (Nns +Ns)| {z }
network externalities
+t|{z}
market power
+
NnsNset
(Nns +Ns)t NnsNse| {z }
negative externalities
(2.10)
Interpretation:
1. The rst term are the costs.
2. The second term captures the e¤ect of network externalities. Network
externalities sti¤en the competition, because each additional customer
does not only yield extra prots, but also adds to the value of the net-
work for all other existing and potential new members. Hence, this term
reduces the price.
3. The third term represents the e¤ect of market power due to di¤erenti-
ation.
4. The fourth term can be interpreted as the e¤ect of the negative ex-
ternalities: These externalities weaken the network externalities on the
non-smoker market side. Assumption 1 ensures that the term is positive.
Because of the symmetry, pA = pB. Therefore each of the two pubs gets
half of both market sides and prots are:
iss =
1
2

t  (Nns +Ns)+ NnsNset
(Nns +Ns)t NnsNse

(Nns +Ns) (2.11)
where the index ss denotes the case we are in (both pubs allow smoking).
Note that assumption 2 guarantees that prots are positive.
Welfare Let us dene welfare in this paper as the sum of consumer and
producer surplus. Note that the prices paid become thereby irrelevant for the
total welfare - as long as markets are covered.
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Consumer surplus is then
CSSQ = CSQns + C
SQ
s
= Nns

uns +

2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  e
2
Ns   pi

+Ns

us +

2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t+ s  pi

Producer surplus is given by
PSSQ = 2i = (pi   c)(Nns +Ns)
Consequently, total welfare sums up to
W SQ =


(Nns +Ns)
2
  1
4
t  c

(Nns +Ns)| {z }
1
+Nnsuns| {z }
2
+Nsus| {z }
3
+sNs| {z }
4
 e
2
NsNns| {z }
5
(2.12)
Interpretation
1. The rst term is the sum of the benets that every consumer has from
enjoying other bar visitorscompany minus the total of transportation
and production costs.
2. The second and third term measure the sum of the value added of visiting
a bar instead of staying at home for the di¤erent consumer types.
3. The fourth term captures the pleasure smokers enjoy from smoking.
4. The fth term is sum of negative externalities that non-smokers su¤er
from the smoke.
2.5 Prohibition of Smoking - A and B as Non-
Smoker Pubs
This section is concerned with the two cases in which either the government
imposes a general smoking ban or in which both pubs prohibit smoking vol-
untarily.
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We nd the pubsdemand in the same way as in the preceding section.
Now, however, the gross utilities are:
U ins = uns + (n
i
nsNns + n
i
sNs)  pi
for a non-smoker who visits pub i. Equivalently,
U is = us + (n
i
nsNns + n
i
sNs)  pi
for a smoker who visits pub i.
The resulting demand reaction functions nil(n
i
m) solve simultaneously for
the following demand fractions:
nins =
1
2
+
pj   pi
t  (Nns +Ns)
nis =
1
2
+
pj   pi
t  (Nns +Ns)
Assumption 2 does not only guarantee that the denominator of nil is non-
zero, but also that the maximization problem is concave in price as well as
non-negativity of prots in the pricing equilibrium.
Prots are generally given by
i = (pi   c)(ninsNns + nisNs)
Substituting for the demand fractions we can rewrite prots as
i = (pi   c) (Nns +Ns)

1
2
+
pj   pi
t  (Nns +Ns)

Di¤erentiation w.r.t. pi, setting this equal to zero, solving for pi yields
the reaction functions. We solve these simultaneously and rearrange to get
equilibrium prices
pi = c|{z}
costs
 (Nns +Ns)| {z }
network externalities
+t|{z}
market power
(2.13)
which is strictly smaller than the price in the status quo case. The reason is
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that the negative externalities of tobacco consumption by smokers e¤ectively
transform into a unilateral decrease of network e¤ects. This softens the price
competition in the status quo case. Consequently, this implies that the oppo-
site, namely a prohibition of smoking in all pubs, increases network e¤ects and
thereby intensies competition.
Proposition 2.1 Under assumptions 1,2, 10 and symmetry an inner solution
is guaranteed. Then prohibition of smoking (by law or by both pubs voluntarily)
increases competition among pubs and therewith result in lower prices.
Because of the symmetry, the two pubs share markets equally. Prots are
therefore:
insns =
1
2
t (Nns +Ns)  1
2
(Nns +Ns)
2
Proposition 2.2 is straightforward:
Proposition 2.2 The prots associated with Proposition 1 are strictly lower
than if both pubs allow smoking.
This result is in line with existing empirical studies. Recall, for example,
Dunham and Marlows (2000) numbers from section 2. They report that 39%
of restaurant owners in the U.S. and 83% of bar owners expect or already
experienced decline in prots as a result of stricter smoking regulation, while
only 6% and 2% respectively predict revenue increases.
Welfare We proceed for this case analogously to the section on the status
quo.
Consumer surplus is given by
CSBan = CBanns + C
Ban
s
= Nns

uns +

2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  pi

+Ns

us +

2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  pi

Producer surplus is given by
PSBan = 2i = (pi   c)(Nns +Ns)
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Consequently, total welfare sums up to
WBan =


2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  c

(Nns +Ns) +Nnsuns +Nsus (2.14)
The interpretation of this equation is the same as for the welfare in the
previous case except that here terms four and ve are missing due to the
smoking ban.
2.6 When is a General Prohibition of Smoking
in Pubs Welfare Improving?
A prohibition of smoking in pubs increases welfare if
WBan > W SQ
)


2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  c

(Nns +Ns) +Nnsuns +Nsus
>


2
(Nns +Ns)  1
4
t  c

(Nns +Ns) +Nnsuns +Nsus + sNs
 e
2
NsNns + sNs (2.15)
, e
2
Nns > s (2.16)
The interpretation of this inequality is straightforward. The positive net
utility that a smoker gets from smoking is smaller than the negative externality
that he causes for the non-smokers who visit the same pub.
Proposition 2.3 Banning smoking is desirable i¤ e
2
Nns > s.
We now have to check whether this inequality contradicts the set of con-
ditions under which it is rational for a pub not to prohibit smoking by itself.
If there is no contradiction, then the legislator should check whether there is
indeed room for a welfare improving ban of smoking in pubs, restaurants, etc.
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2.7 One Smoker Pub and One Non-Smoker
Pub
In order to understand why there are so few - if any - non-smoker pubs we need
to calculate prots for a pub that decides to prohibit smoking unilaterally. Let
us here take A as the pub that prohibits smoking.
As in the previous sections market fractions are given by
nil =
1
2
+
U il   U jl
2t
(2.17)
Proceeding in the same way as before, we nd the explicit expression for nil
with the di¤erence being that there is no symmetry between the pubs anymore:
For the non-smoker side:
nAns =
1:z}|{
1
2
+
2:z }| {
(pB   pA)t
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse
+
3:z }| {
 (pB   pA)Nse
4:z }| {
+eNs(s  Ns + t)
5:z }| {
 2Nss
2(2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse) (2.18)
nBns = 1  nAns =
1
2
+
(pA   pB)t
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse
+
 (pA   pB)Nse  eNs(s  Ns + t) + 2Nss
2(2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse) (2.19)
Interpretation: For illustrative reasons let us analyze nAns. For n
B
ns an
analogous interpretation holds, except that some signs are reverted.
1. Each pub gets half the market.
2. Pub A gets an additional share if its price is lower than that of pub B.
3. The negative externalities that non-smokers su¤er from smoking soften
the price e¤ects. This is best understood in comparative statics terms.
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Consider some status quo demand nAns. Suppose now that pub B raises
its price. We would expect nAns to increase. This, however, is not unam-
biguously the case, because as pB increases, also smokers leave pub B (on
the margin exactly Ns). Therewith, the amount of smoke is reduced (by
precisely eNs on the margin) and thus more non-smokers are attracted
to pub B and thereby less to pub A.
4. The fourth component captures the positive demand e¤ect of the negative
externalities: The marginal group of smokers at pub B produces Ns units
of smoke, i.e. Nse units of smoking externalities. This will drive non-
smokers out of pub B into pub A. (The term in brackets is larger than
zero by assumption 2.)
5. The fth factor represents the comparative advantage that utility from
smoking gives the smoker pub B: Smokers have more utility (net trans-
portation costs) from pub B than from pub A. Thus, c.p. they prefer
this pub. This increases the network size in B, which again attracts also
non-smokers.
For the smoker side:
nAs =
1
2
+
1z }| {
(pB   pA)t
2z }| {
 s(t  Nns)
3z }| {
+
1
2
eNnsNs
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse (2.20)
nBs = 1  nAs =
1
2
+
(pA   pB)t+ s(t  Nns)  12eNnsNs
2(t2   t(Nns +Ns)) + NnsNse (2.21)
Interpretation:
Each pub gets half the market plus a factor whose numerator consists of
three parts:
1. Market power due to product di¤erentiation softens the competition.
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2. This component measures the value added of allowing smoking. Due to
assumption 2 it is always negative for the non-smoker pub and positive
for the smoker pub.
3. The third part measures the interaction between the negative externality
of smoking, network e¤ects and groups sizes. It adds demand to the
non-smoker pub and decreases the demand for the smoker pub for the
following reason: non-smokers dislike smoke and will therefore prefer the
non-smoker pub A. This increases As network and thereby also attracts
more smokers.
Prots are given by
i = (pi   c)(ninsNns + nisNs) (2.22)
both of which are quadratic in own price. Furthermore, both are concave
under assumptions 1 and 2. To nd the equilibrium prices we di¤erentiate
w.r.t. pi, set this equal to zero, solve for pi to get the reaction functions. We
solve these simultaneously and rearrange to get equilibrium prices
pA = c|{z}
costs
 (Nns +Ns)| {z }
network externalities
+t|{z}
market power
+
4NnsNset
6t(Nns +Ns)  3NnsNse| {z }
negative externalities
 sNs 2t Nns
6t(Nns +Ns)  3NnsNse| {z }
comparative disadvantage
(2.23)
pB = c|{z}
costs
 (Nns +Ns)| {z }
network externalities
+t|{z}
market power
+
2NnsNset
6t(Nns +Ns)  3NnsNse| {z }
negative externalities
+sNs
2t Nns
6t(Nns +Ns)  3NnsNse| {z }
comparative advantage
(2.24)
Interpretation: Note that the rst three terms of each price are identical
to those of equation 2.4, i.e. for the price pair in the section, where both pubs
were of the smoker type.
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1. The rst term are the costs.
2. The second term captures the e¤ect of network externalities.
3. The third term represents the e¤ect of market power due to the price
di¤erentiation.
4. The fourth term is positive by our concavity assumption, and it can
be interpreted as the e¤ect of the negative externalities. Note, how-
ever, that now pub A is a non-smoker pub. For the smoker pub (B)
the interpretation from the previous section still holds: The negative ex-
ternalities weaken the network externalities on the non-smoker market
side, thereby giving the di¤erentiation parameter a stronger weight. This
e¤ect is therefore still larger than zero but
 smaller in comparison with equation 2.4 and
 smaller in comparison with the price the non-smoker pub can de-
mand (pA)
because non-smokers are deterred from the smoker pub and attracted
by the non-smoker pub. For the non-smoker pub (A) the interpretation
changes: People do not smoke here. Therefore, the network externalities
are not weakened on the non-smoker side. They rather increase non-
smokerswillingness to pay.
5. As long as Nns < 2t, i.e. the number of non-smokers is su¢ ciently small,
the fth term is negative for pub A and positive for pub B. The reason
is that it captures the value that being allowed to smoke adds to pub Bs
guests, i.e. pub Bs comparative advantage.
Note that we do not make any assumptions that guarantee positive prots
here. The reason is that we want to nd out why A is smaller than i of
the previous section, because this should be the case. Otherwise we would
observe non-smoker bars. This, however, explicitly includes the possibility
that A < 0.
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The prots can be found by substituting equilibrium prices into the prot
functions. Simplication yields
Anss =
(2Nst( 3t+ 3Ns + 6Nns+ s) + 6Nnst(Nns   t)
18( NnsNse+ 2Nst+ 2tNns)
 NnsNse(3Ns+ s+ t+ 3Nns))2
(NnsNse+ 2t2   2Nst  2tNns) (2.25)
Bnss =
(2Nst(3t  3Ns   6Nns+ s)  6Nnst(Nns   t)
18( NnsNse+ 2Nst+ 2tNns)
+NnsNse(3Ns  s  t+ 3Nns))2
(NnsNse+ 2t2   2Nst  2tNns) (2.26)
2.8 Is there a Case for Governmental Inter-
vention?
Up to now we have solved the problem on stages 3-5. Now we are at stage 2.
Suppose that e
2
Nns > s holds, but that the legislation does not issue a general
ban of smoking in the hope that the free market solves the externality problem
by itself. How do pubs react? Is it possible that both pubs allow smoking,
nevertheless? The following payo¤ matrix illustrates the situation:
Pub B
smoking non-smoking
Pub A smoking Ass = 
B
ss 
A
sns 
B
sns
non-smoking Anss 
B
nsns 
A
nsns = 
B
nsns
Indeed, smoking/smoking can be a Nash equilibrium, despite the fact that
e
2
Nns > s, as is shown in the proof of proposition 2.4. Then, however, the
legislation should enact a general ban of smoking, because the market yields a
welfare inferior outcome.
Proposition 2.4 Under assumptions 1-10, a general ban of smoking by law is
necessary and welfare improving if e
2
Nns > s and Anss < 
A
ss (and equivalently
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Bsns < 
B
ss). There exists a range of parameter constellations, for which this is
the case.
Proof. The task is to prove that there exists a solution to a certain set of
inequalities. The inequalities are:
First, a pub must get higher prots from allowing smoking (equation 2.11)
than from prohibiting it unilaterally (equation 2.25):
1
2

t  (Nns +Ns)+ NnsNset
(Nns +Ns)t NnsNse

(Nns +Ns)
  1
18
( 6Nst2   6Nnst2 + 6N2s t NnsNset+ 12NnsNst+ 2Nsst+ 6tN2ns
( NnsNse+ 2Nst+ 2tNns)
 3NnsN2s e NnsNses  3N2nsNse)2
(NnsNse+ 2t2   2Nst  2tNns)
 0 (2.27)
Second, prohibiting smoking in all pubs must be welfare superior to not
prohibiting it, i.e. e
2
Nns > s must hold. This can be translated into s =
e
2
Nns   " with " > 0. Substituting for s in 2.27 yields
1
2

t  (Nns +Ns)+ NnsNset
(Nns +Ns)t NnsNse

(Nns +Ns)
  1
18
( 6Nst2   6Nnst2 + 6N2s t NnsNset+ 12NnsNst
( NnsNse+ 2Nst+ 2tNns)
+(2tNs  Nnse)( e2Nns   ") + 6tN2ns   3NnsN2s e  3N2nsNse)2
(NnsNse+ 2t2   2Nst  2tNns)
 0 (2.28)
Additionally the assumptions 1-10 and " > 0 must hold.
The proof used here is a proof by construction: We construct an interval
of solutions in R.
Assume the following valid parameter values (assumptions 1, 3-10 and " > 0
are fullled): Nns = Ns = 300; e = 0:01; t = 20; " = 0:001; us = uns = 14.
Inserting these values in 2.28 yields
5565617:700  192744:2130
23100  800  0 (2.29)
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Note that by assumption 2  is now restricted to the interval [0; 1=30].
Therefore we can solve inequation 2.29 for :
  0; 034631234732489800727779056761301
It follows that one solution to the set of twelve inequalities is given by:
Nns = Ns = 300; e = 0:01; t = 20; " = 0:001; us = uns = 14; 

0;
1
30

The easiest way to get an intuition for this result is to ignore the social
network parameter, i.e. set  = 0 for illustration. Then the result from
proposition 2.4 is driven only by the negative externality from smoking. At
the outset one may think that in absence of complicating social network e¤ects
pub A should always gain from prohibiting smoking, because the prohibition
will give it a competitive advantage. On the margin this is indeed the case.
But there is an additional e¤ect. Prohibiting smoking works as a softening of
negative network e¤ects or, in other words, as an increase of (positive) network
externalities. Thus, it increases competition. If pub A prohibits smoking and
e
2
Nns > s holds, then pub B loses more customers on the non-smoker side than
it wins on the smoker side. This may force the owner of pub B to lower its
price. Pub A will react by decreasing its own price and may end up with lower
prots than if it had not banned smoking in its domain.
What role does the social network parameter  play? It turns out that the
overall e¤ect is ambiguous and hinges on the relation to the other parameters.
This can best be seen by concentrating on the thickness of the two market
sides. If, for instance, Ns is relatively large, then  spurs two countervailing
e¤ects. On the one hand, the social network e¤ect makes the comparative
advantage from being a non-smoker pub smaller on the margin. It thereby
makes it less likely that the pub gains by prohibiting smoking. On the other
hand, together with the comparative advantage also the competitive pressure
decreases, i.e. the other, the smoker pub will - if at all - lower its price less
strongly. Thus, the overall e¤ect of  is ambiguous and dependent on the other
parameters.
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2.9 Extension: Separate Seating for Smokers
and Non-Smokers
Typically, the literature as well as opponents of smoking bans concentrate in
their argumentation on separate seating and not so much on complete bans.
They do not claim that pubs would prohibit smoking completely if it were
in the interest of the customers. Rather they say that owners would o¤er
separate seatings for smokers and non-smokers. In the optimum, seating will
be allocated according to the peoples preferences.
In our model such a decision can be interpreted as a decrease in externality
each smoker produces in a smoking pub. If separation can be done perfectly, e
may be set to zero. What is the e¤ect? Do pubs have an interest in doing so?
If one pub decides to do so, we are in case 3. The only di¤erence to our
analysis above is that now pub A does not lose any customers on the smoker
side. This also means, however, that pub B is even more under pressure to
lower its price. The resulting price may make pub A even worse o¤.
Some people may rightfully object that pub B could also react by o¤er-
ing separate seating itself. The relevant case for this situation is the one in
which both pubs allow smoking, i.e. section 2.4. How does a decrease in the
externality in both pubs a¤ect prots here? Recall equation 2.11.
A = B = i =
1
2

t  (Nns +Ns)+ NnsNset
(Nns +Ns)t NnsNse

(Nns +Ns)
Under assumption 2 prots are increasing with the externality. Therefore,
while it may be in the unilateral interest of a pub to o¤er separate seating for
non-smokers, it is certainly not in the whole industriesinterest. This helps to
explain the intensity with which the German gastronomy lobby groups ght
against smoking bans.
2.10 Conclusion
In Germany it is controversially discussed whether the legislation should enact
a general ban of smoking in restaurants, bars and alike establishments. The
main argument in favor of such a regulatory measure is that smokers produce a
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negative externality from which non-smokers need to be protected. Opponents
of such an intervention claim that the free market solves this problem itself.
If it were in the interest of consumers to have non-smoker bars, owners would
follow customers demand and prohibit smoking. The fact that this is not
done, shows that consumers prefer smoker bars. Therefore, no general ban is
needed.
This paper investigates the arguments used in this debate. It is shown that
the free market does not necessarily act in the publics interest. There are
reasonable ranges of parameter constellations for which pubs do not prohibit
smoking in their domain, although this would increase welfare. The reason for
this is the following: When a customer consumes tobacco, the resulting smoke
spreads in the whole room, disturbing all non-smokers present. Therefore
smoking externalities take the form of negative network externalities. Negative
network externalities, however, soften competition. In this sense, choosing to
allow smoking can work as a collusive device for bars.
A typical drawback of the Hotelling model used in this paper is that market
coverage has to be assumed to capture competitive e¤ects. I concede that it
would be more realistic to have a deeper market to allow for consumers who
do not go to a pub. A starting point for such a model is described by Bockem
(1994). It turns out, however, that such a model with network externalities
and asymmetric rms, as needed for our purpose, is very tedious to track.
I conjecture, furthermore, that it also does not make any di¤erence for the
key results of this paper for the following reasons. First, in all three cases
rms would demand lower prices, but smoking regulation will nevertheless
strengthen competition and lead to even lower prices. Second, from the welfare
perspective lower prices are good and make smoking regulation even more
desirable.
I conclude that the free market does not necessarily yield the welfare opti-
mal outcome. There may very well be a case for governmental intervention in
the form of a general smoking ban. In the end this is, however, an empirical
question. The value of this paper lies in structuring the question, identifying
the crucial e¤ects and building the foundation for empirical work.
Chapter 3
The Puzzle of Non-Informative
Advertising: A Behavioral
Approach
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3.1 Introduction
Advertising is a phenomenon that economists usually feel ambiguous about.
On the one side, some advertising (like yellow pages) reveals information about
product attributes, quality and price. Since this reduces information, search
and transaction costs as well as increases price competition, this sort of adver-
tising is clearly welfare increasing.1 On the other side, there is non-informative
advertising (like TV commercials). As an example, take a handsome middle-
aged model driving a BMW sports vehicle down a scenic coastline. What
does this tell a consumer? Not much. Still, there must be some reaction in
consumer behavior. Otherwise, rms would be wasting billions of dollars (in
2003 the TV advertising expenditures in the U.S. alone rose over $50 billion).2
So, how does non-informative advertising work? Does it inuence demand?
Always? When? What are the welfare implications? Is Marshall (1919) right
by describing advertising as a social waste?
The explanation that comes to mind rst is that advertising could have
an inuence on peoples preferences. This persuasive view was developed
by Chamberlin (1933), Kaldor (1950) and others.3 Typically, however, these
works lack microeconomic modelling of consumer behavior. Rather, it is sim-
ply assumed that advertising shifts the demand curve outwards. Thus, these
models are not applicable in answering our question, because, rst, it is left
open why exactly demand is increased. Second, by assuming that advertising
somehow changes preferences, fundamental assumptions on rational behavior
are violated. Third, stringent welfare analysis is not possible - simply because
there is no stringent micro foundation.
This failure has inspired some researchers (especially Nelson (1970, 1974))
to alter the informative view by postulating that "non-informative" advertising
may convey information indirectly. They claim that there are goods the qual-
ity of which can only be experienced. Non-informative advertising can then
convey indirect information by working as some sort of signal of the goods
1This informative viewof advertising was rst developed by Ozga (1960), Stigler (1961),
and Telser (1964). For a good overview on the advertsing literature in general see Bagwell
(2003).
2Source: TNS Media Intelligence/CMR (2006).
3see also Braithwaite (1928), Robinson (1933), Galbraith (1958, 1967), Packard (1957,
1969), Dixit and Norman (1978).
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quality. While this idea has its appeal, it, too, faces limitations. First, the
distinction between experience and normal (pure search goods) is somewhat
arbitrary. Second, Nelson does not provide a formal model of his predictions.
Subsequent researchers, especially Schmalensee (1978), provide such a model
and show that it is not necessarily true that (only) high quality rms adver-
tise.4 For example, a producer of low quality typically also has lower marginal
costs. He will therefore gain di¤erentially from demand expansion and conse-
quently advertise more. Additionally, producers of high quality nd it more
protable to signal quality through prices. These objections are supported by
the empirical literature.5
The third prominent approach to advertising is the complementary view
developed by Stigler and Becker (1977) and extended by Becker and Murphy
(1993). They claim that advertising is a complement to the good advertised.
Then, as advertising increases, the marginal utility of the good also increases
and so does demand. Modelling advertising this way allows for standard wel-
fare analysis. Still, in the application of this theory a number of problems
arise. First, it is unclear why and in what way advertising increases the mar-
ginal utility of the advertised good. An intuitive justication would be that
advertising raises the prestige of the good consumed. However, prestige is usu-
ally considered as some sort of admiration that other people have for the good.
In other words, the consumers marginal utility is increased only if peer mates
regard the good as more valuable. Then, however, ones own consumption of
advertising becomes irrelevant.6 Second, it is questionable whether people con-
sume advertisement on a voluntary basis. Third, modelling advertisement and
the advertised good as complements also implies that the more I consume the
more I enjoy watching advertisement for the good, which seems a bit awkward.
In this paper a new theory of non-informative advertising is o¤ered that
is based upon new developments in behavioral economics. The theory has
two elements. First, it is claimed that consumer decisions are embedded in
social environments. To incorporate this into the formal analysis the theory
of inequity aversion is transformed into a standard consumer optimization
4See also Horstmann and MacDonald (1994) and Bagwell (2003).
5See e.g. Caves and Greene (1996) and Bagwell (2003) for an overview.
6Engström (2004) picks up this criticism and shows how the Becker and Murphy model
can be generalized.
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problem. Second, it is argued that advertising may work as a mean to change
peoples reference group rather than their preferences.
3.2 A Behavioral Model of Advertising
3.2.1 Reference Points and Utility
Consider the simplest possible consumption decision of an individual who de-
rives utility from consuming a consumption good of quantity or quality x and
money m. Specically, assume that his utility function is of the quasi-linear
form.7 Also, let the consumer face a standard budget constraint as well as the
usual non-negativity constraints:
Ui(xi;mi) = ui(xi) +mi (3.1)
s.t. pxi +mi  Mi (3.2)
xi  0 (3.3)
mi  0 (3.4)
where p is the market price for the consumer good and Mi > 0 the con-
sumers budget, both of which are exogenously given. Assume the individual is
completely informed about all the parameters and the goods characteristics.
Next, I claim that peoples utility is not independent from the consumption
of others. Admittedly, this is a debatable assumption. Whether or not utility
depends on what other people have and consume is to a large extent related
to what goods one talks about. One could, for example, distinguish necessity
goods (like oxygen, water and food), whose e¤ect on utility is quite irrelevant of
other peoples consumption, versus luxury (in a very broad sense) goods such
as cars, perfume, diamonds, alcohol, cigarettes, clothes, sweets, etc. Indeed,
advertising for necessity goods (bread, fruits, etc.) is rather scarce.8 The
7In most cases it is more intuitive to think of xi in terms of quality - an example of which
would be cars (a lower value of xi is associated with a middle class type of car and higher
one with a more luxurious one). Note that in this setting p would have to be interpreted as
the price per unit of quality.
8Note that this distinction is quite arbitrary. For example, we see advertising for di¤erent
kinds of mineral water. Clearly, water is a necessity good. But tap water would usually
do it, too. One can easily formalize these observations into the quality setting, described
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detailed discussion of this distinction is not of interest here, though. All we
need is that consumers compare themselves to other people - a peer group
- and that this inuences their utility in a specic way: it changes at least
in some range of xi their marginal utility. The basic idea is that individual
(consumption) decisions are usually made in a social context.9
There has been considerable e¤ort in research to explore in what way peo-
ples utility is dependent on other peoples consumption, starting from simple
altruism models, followed by the relative income hypothesis, and most recently,
very sophisticated theoretic and experimental studies on envy, reciprocity, fair-
ness, inequity aversion, etc.10. Of special interest here are the more recent
developments. Specically, let us use a slightly adjusted version of the theory
of inequity aversion developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and assume that
our individuals utility from consumption of x takes the form
ui(xi; xj) =
(
i(xi)  i 1n 1
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xi); 0g for n  2
i(xi) for n = 1
(3.5)
where i(xi) denotes the direct utility the individual derives from con-
suming xi, on which we impose the usual conditions i(0) = 0,
di(xi)
dxi
> 0,
d2i(xi)
dx2i
< 0, and di(xi)
dxi

xi=0
= 1. Further, i  0 measures the degree of
the individuals discomfort with inequity that is to his disadvantage, n is the
number of people in is reference (peer) group, xj denotes the consumption of
reference peer j, and i(xj) is the utility level that i assigns to js consump-
tion.11
above by saying that only from some threshold xi onwards the utility is dependent on other
peoples consumption of x. For a more detailed sociologic discussion see e.g. Lichtenberg
(1996).
9Samuelson (2004) provides a nice evolutionary explanation for why people may have
developed utility functions that exhibit relative consumption e¤ects. He shows that social
preferences can help individuals to survive in a uctuating environment, because it induces
them to make use of information that is conveyed by compatriotsactions.
10For a survey of the related literature see e.g Fehr and Schmidt (2001).
11Note three distinct changes to the original Fehr-Schmidt utility function:
1. I use direct utility instead of income. This is a neglectable change if one thinks of i
as money-measured utility.
2. I assume individual i to compare himself to the utility that he assigns to xj rather
than what j assigns to it. This way the utility function is more similar to the Fehr-
Schmidt one, where measurable pay-o¤s are compared. In principle, one could of
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This utility function di¤ers from standard utility theory by the second term,
which measures the utility loss from disadvantageous inequity. Individual i
su¤ers if people of his reference group consume more of x than he does. The
more peers consume more than him, the more he su¤ers. What is more, he only
cares about his own relative position within the group (self-centered inequity)
rather than about overall equity within the group. Note that the inequity
aversion term is normalized by division by n  1 to make the relative e¤ect of
inequity aversion on is total payo¤ independent of the number of players.
I use the Fehr-Schmidt utility function, because it is simple, intuitive, and
achieves very good results in most economic set-ups that can be tested in
experiments, specically in the ultimatum game, public good games with and
without punishment, the gift exchange game, and market games. One could
also use alternative utility functions such as developed in Bolton (1991), Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000), or Charness and Rabin (1999). The principal mechanics
for our purpose remain the same as long as at least in some environments the
addition of one player j with xj changes the marginal utility of xi. The driving
force of this is usually some sort of envy or inequity aversion. I discuss the
implications of using this utility function instead of others as we go along.
Let us now turn to the consumption decision.
3.2.2 Consumer Behavior in Absence of Advertising
The consumer faces the following optimization problem
course also use j instead, which could be argued to be more realistic, because people
already get jealous when they see how much other people enjoy some amount xj that
they themselves would not enjoy that much. I believe, though, that it is more sensible
to use i because i usually does not know js utility function.
3. This model is one of envy, only. Including dislike of positive deviation from average
consumption does not change the results qualitatively.
Chapter 3 - The Puzzle of Noninformative Advertising 69
max
xi;mi
Ui(xi;mi) = i(xi)
 i 1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi); 0g+mi (3.6)
s.t. pxi +mi  Mi (3.7)
xi  0 (3.8)
mi  0 (3.9)
which is a bit inconvenient, because the utility function exhibits kinks at
every xi = xj. It is thus not continuously di¤erentiable. It is, however, still
concave, continuous and piecewise twice continuously di¤erentiable for all xi 6=
xj. For illustrative reasons let us therefore assume that the parameters are such
that in the outset the optimal consumption bundle xi is an interior solution
(i.e. xi <
Mi
p
) and that xi 6= xj.12 It is characterized by
xi : 
0
i(x

i ) =
p
1 + i
1
n 1n
H
mi = Mi   pxi
where nH(xi ) is dened as the number of peers j who consume more than
i in equilibrium, i.e. all peers j with xj > xi .
3.2.3 Consumer Behavior in Presence of Advertising
How does advertising a¤ect the consumers optimization problem? The per-
suasive view claims that advertising changes the basic utility function of the
individual and thereby creates wants. I, on the contrary, claim that advertis-
ing only changes the individuals reference group. In other words, it does not
create wants, but rather the feeling of consuming too little. In proceeding this
way violations of the basic assumptions that underlie consumer theory can be
avoided: The basic utility function given by (5) stays the same, advertising
only changes the peer group.
What precisely do I mean? Take the pre-advertising set-up described in
12See appendix 3.A.1 for the formal analysis.
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the last section. Suppose that now the consumer is exposed to repeated adver-
tisement in which some model j = m consumes xm. Suppose that for whatever
reasons this model enters the reference group of our individual i.13 Then his
optimization problem becomes:
max
xi;mi
Ui(xi;mi) = i(xi)  i
1
n
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi); 0g (3.10)
 i 1
n
maxfi(xm)  i(xi); 0g+mi (3.11)
s.t. pxi +mi  Mi (3.12)
xi  0 (3.13)
mi  0 (3.14)
Naturally, some questions arise in reaction to proceeding this way. Let us
anticipate them:
1. Do consumers really compare themselves to ideal models in advertising?
 In many circumstances, yes. As an example think of teenage girls
who watch a model putting skin cream on her face.14
 In other cases this may not be true. Then, however, advertising
can work as a reminder of people like the models. As an example
take a standard middle-aged male model driving a BMW sports
cabriolet down the Californian coast line. Middle-aged middle class
males that watch this commercial may not compare themselves to
the model itself, but very well to people like the model whom they
half-know or see on the street.
13One could also argue that the model has always been in the individuums reference
group (like e.g. sport stars), but the individuum had no knowledge about xj . Advertising
can then be interpreted as a signal of xj . The prinicpal mechanics stay the same, but the
qualitative outcomes for xm < xi change.
14In this example the girls envy the models look, of course, which presumably has very
little to do with the cream. This can, however, easily be incorporated into our analysis.
Suppose the utility of consuming x also depends on some factor (or good) a that is not pur-
chaseable (like e.g. genetic predisposition), where @(x; a)=@a > 0. Analogously, consider
now some xm, xi , ai, am with am > ai. The mechanics of our approach remain the same,
with slightly di¤erent results.
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2. Concerning the rst point, why do these girls not compare themselves to
these models in absence of advertising?
 They are models or ideals. They do not exist the way they are
presented in advertising.
3. Concerning the second point of item number one, why are not these
realpeople part of the consumers peer group to start with?
 People like this may be so rare that one does not meet them regu-
larly enough.
 People like this could be in a di¤erent social class that the consumer
does not interact with on a basis regular enough so to make him
incorporate them into his reference group. As an example, ordinary
New Yorkers are unlikely to include movie stars they see once in a
while on the street in their daily life peer group.
 Even if one encounters model-like people regularly enough, they do
not talk to you, smile at you, etc. The quality of interaction is
insu¢ cient to make them a peer.
4. If that is so, how can advertising make the models (or the people like
them) members of the consumers reference group?
 Advertising strategists make consumers familiar with the models
and products by often repeating commercials over a longer period
of time.
 The models behave in a much more direct way to the consumer.
They are put into a specic, possibly ordinary, environment (not
just the street), smile, talk to the consumer, etc.
Accepting this argumentation, how does advertising change consumption
behavior? To get an intuition, let us look at gure 1, in which u(xi) before
(blue) and after advertising (red) is depicted. How does the addition of a
reference point, say x2 < xm < x3; a¤ect consumption?
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Figure 1: Before advertising (blue) with peers x2 = 2 and x3 = 20. After
advertising (red) with peers at x2 = 2 and x3 = 20 and xm = 11.
Proposition 3.1 For every xi 6= xj and xi 2 [0; xm[ marginal utility u0i(xi)
increases. For every xi 6= xj and xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g[ marginal utility
decreases. For every xi > maxfxm; xmaxj g marginal utility remains unchanged.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.2.
Since marginal utility determines the consumption level, such advertising
changes consumption behavior. Specically:
Proposition 3.2 If consumer i consumes xi 6= xj and xi 2 [0; xm[ in the pre-
advertising situation, then advertising induces him to increase consumption.
For every xi 6= xj and xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g[ consumption decreases. For
every xi > maxfxm; xmaxj g consumption is una¤ected. In the case of xi = xj it
is possible that consumption is a¤ected by advertising, but need not. If xi =
Mi
p
,
then consumption can only be a¤ected if xm < Mip < x
max
j . In this case it can
be decreased, but need not.
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Proof. See appendix 3.A.3.
What is the intuition behind the increase of consumption for xi 2 [0; xm[?
Consumer i feels that he is consuming too little in comparison to his peer
group.15 He therefore adjusts consumption. As an example, think of a teenager
who is afraid of deviating too much from his peer group and is permanently
confronted with the good/accessory that his peers (will) consume.
Analogously, a consumer who consumes "too much" will adjust his con-
sumption downwards, because he feels that he is over-spending in comparison
with his peers.16
Note that the necessary condition for the advertising to be successful is
that it changes the consumers reference group. The su¢ cient condition is
that it changes consumers marginal utility at the point of his consumption.
The necessary condition may in reality not always be fullled for all advertising
and for all consumers. This will depend on the underlying structure of each
individuals reference group and of the design of advertising. For example, the
number of reference points in a persons reference group is certainly limited, i.e.
n 2 f1; 2; :::; ng (due to limited capacities of brain, memory, and psychology).
In this sense our analysis has interesting implications also for the design of
advertising. This can, however, not be analyzed in more detail without a
stringent theory of reference groups and their changes - a promising eld for
future research.17
Remark 3.1 It may seem implausible (though not necessarily wrong) that ad-
vertising can also decrease consumption. Four arguments need to be taken
notice of here. First, goods advertised are usually new products - i.e. con-
sumer i actually compares the depreciated value of his consumption good to
the new good. Second, it is plausible that not all advertising changes peoples
15Another interpretation is that he interprets advertising as a signal of what peers (will)
consume.
16This e¤ect, captured by the decrease of the -term due to an increase of n, will be
amplied for those individuals who detest consuming more than their peers (the -term in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
17The inuence of the social environment on peoples behavior has long been a research
topic for a number of disciplines, especially sociology and psychology. Reference group theory
was initiated by Stou¤er et al. (1949) and was a hot topic among sociologists throughout the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. A classic overview is given by Merton (1968). In this context, also
the modern literature on the formation of (social) networks (e.g. Jin, Girvan and Newman
(2001) and Albert-László Barabási, 2003) may be helpful.
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reference groups (see above). Third, rms have incentives to set xm high. It
is therefore unlikely that consumers will be faced by some xm < xi , if it is not
in the rmsinterests. Fourth, for producers of lower quality it may be prof-
itable to decrease the quality that the consumers consume. See the discussion
of perfect substitutes below.
3.3 Welfare
The standard welfare concept denes welfare as the sum of producer and
consumer surplus. The welfare associated with the situations pre- and post-
advertising is therefore:
W  = i(x

i )  i
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g+Mi   cxi
W ad = i(x
ad
i )
 i 1
n  1
 
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xadi ); 0g+maxfi(xm)  i(xadi ); 0g
!
+Mi   cxadi   A
where A is some xed cost of advertising. The di¤erence is then
W = W ad  W  = i(xadi )  i(xi )
 i 1
n
 
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xadi ); 0g+maxfi(xm)  i(xadi ); 0g
!
+i
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g+ c(xi   xadi )  A
Proposition 3.3 The welfare e¤ect is ambiguous for all xi < xm. Also
for all xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g[ it is ambiguous. It is negative for all xi >
maxfxm; xmaxj g.
Proof. See appendix 3.A.4.
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While it is clear that for all xi > maxfxm; xmaxj g welfare is decreased (no
change in utility, consumption, producer surplus, but loss from spending on
advertising), this is not so obvious for the other two cases.
The ambiguity in the range of xi < xm stems from the increase in con-
sumption and peer e¤ects. Since consumption increases so does direct utility
i(x
ad
i ). This alone can outweigh the welfare losses of advertising and pro-
duction costs. The reason is that due to p  c the welfare optimal amount
of consumption is larger than the realized one, xi  xsoi . Additionally, there
is a second e¤ect, the peer e¤ect. Clearly, the addition of the peer xm > xi
can deprive the consumer, i.e. decrease his utility. But it need not. Adver-
tising may make him also better o¤. As an example recall gure 1, in which
utility increases in response to advertising in a range [xi; xm] with xi < xm.
Mathematically spoken the reason for this is that is average di¤erence in con-
sumption from its peers is reduced. The intuitive interpretation of this is that
i feels assured of consuming quite rightly in relation to his peers.
The ambiguity for the case of xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g is a bit more di¢ -
cult to understand, because in this range indirect utility is increased by the
advertising18. At the same time, however, producer surplus is decreased, be-
cause consumption falls. Since the payments pxadi net out, we are left with the
comparison of the social gain from lower production and the social loss from
utility, which can be negative.
Summing up, we can record that the welfare e¤ect of successful non-
informative advertising is ambiguous. This is somewhat surprising, because
the way we look at non-informative advertising in this paper is a very negative
one. We postulate that non-informative advertising plays a role in manipulat-
ing the social environment of consumers in a way that is protable for rms,
but in some cases depriving for consumers. Nevertheless this may be benecial
for social welfare, because from a bird-eyes perspective it is desirable that the
consumer buys higher quantity (or quality), as long as p > c.
18It is easy to see that in this range utility at xi is increased by advertising: U(x

i ) 
Uad(xi )
() i(xi )  i 1n
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g+Mi   pxi
 i(xi )  i 1n 1
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g+Mi   pxi
By optimality we then also have Uad(xadi )  Uad(xi ), i.e. indirect utility is increased by
advertising.
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Remark 3.2 It is important to note that here welfare is dened as the sum of
the rents of producer and one consumer. A complete welfare analysis would
have to include the e¤ects on other producers (not only rivals, but every pro-
ducer of whom the consumer is a customer, because all of them are a¤ected by
the consumers change in behavior), all individuals i that are a¤ected by the
advertising, as well as all people of whose peer group consumer i is a member.
A general analysis of this sort is not very promising, though, because it would
consist of a very large number of case di¤erentiations at the end of which the
ambiguity result will again prevail.
3.4 Perfect Substitutes
One possible objection against the model is that a larger product variety could
per se be utility decreasing - which would indeed be an implausible implication
of the model. My belief is that this is not true for two reasons. First, it is
sensible to interpret product variety in terms of perfect substitutes. Second,
product variety is usually advantageous only at the specic point in time when
one buys something. How do these characteristics of product variety enter into
the model?
Perfect substitutes (say x and y) should be incorporated into the model in
the following way:
Ui(xi; yi;mi) = ui(xi; yi) +mi
where ui(xi; yi) = i(aixi + biyi)
 i 1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(aixj + biyj)  i(aixi + biyi); 0g for n  2 (3.15)
If product variety is increased, this would change the utility function only
by adding more terms into i(aixi + biyi), which per se does not change the
utility level.
Remark 3.3 Note that the introduction of new products may lead to an in-
crease of the amount of advertising one consumes. This may change the ref-
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erence group and thereby decrease utility. This is, however, a di¤erent argu-
mentation, namely: An increased number of non-informative advertising spots
decreases utility.
As a matter of fact, the addition of a product can increase is utility if i
decides to make a new buy, because of the ercer price competition and the
increased variety. To illustrate the rst argument, suppose i prefers x over y.
The introduction of y may now force the producer of x to decrease px, which
c.p. increases is utility. For the second argument it is su¢ cient to imagine
that i simply prefers y over x, i.e. bi > ai.
One more way in which the introduction of y can increase utility is that
some of is peers switch to y, whereas i prefers x.
Remark 3.4 One straightforward implication of this analysis is that non-
informative advertising has no inuence on the competition between producers
of perfect substitutes (as long as he produces the whole range of quality). That
is non-informative advertising will not convince people to change brands. Even
more, advertising for y will not only not decrease is consumption of x, but may
well increase it. Thus, a commercial for BMW may not only increase demand
for BMW, but also for Mercedes. This is, however, not at all unrealistic. One
may call this the cooperative e¤ect of non-cooperative advertising.
Remark 3.5 It is, however, still possible that BMW is threatened by adver-
tising of a producer like Porsche or Seat who o¤ers quality that BMW does
not o¤er. Mathematically spoken, suppose producer A (e.g. BMW) produces
good x where x 2 [x; x] and producer B (e.g. Seat) produces good y where
y 2 [y; y]. Let x and y be perfect substitutes, such that consumers utility is
given by (3.15). For simplicity assume ai = bi = 1 and suppose that c.p.
i(y) < i(x), i.e. A produces higher quality than B. Also suppose that in the
outset i is consuming good x, i.e. some xi 2 [x; x]. Producer B has now an
incentive to advertise his product in such a way that i is willing to lower the
quality of consumption until xadi < x. Because then i will switch to producer
B. (In other words, BMW loses market shares to Seat.)
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3.5 Conclusion
Among economists it is still an open debate how non-informative advertising
works and whether it is socially benecial or a social waste. This paper o¤ers
a new approach to this topic. The theory has two elements. First, it is argued
that consumer decisions are embedded in social environments. To incorporate
this into the formal analysis it is assumed that peoples utility functions are not
independent of other peoples consumption decisions. More precisely, a slightly
adjusted version of a specic functional form, developed by Fehr and Schmidt
(1999), is used, which is known to be able to explain the experimental results of
most standard economic games. In principal, however, other functional forms
would work just as well - as long as at least in some environments a change
in the reference group also changes the marginal utility. Second, it is argued
that watching often repeated advertising makes viewers gradually compare
themselves to the advertisement models (or people like them). In other words,
advertising may work as a mean to change peoples reference group rather than
their utility function (as proposed by early theorizing).
The advantage of this framework is that it is able to explain how non-
informative advertising can a¤ect consumer decision without violating basic
assumptions that underlie microeconomic theory, such as rationality and stable
preferences. Additionally, welfare analysis is applicable. Specically, it is
shown that although e¤ective advertising can cause relative deprivation for the
consumer, its welfare e¤ect is ambiguous. The exact welfare e¤ect depends
on the structure of reference groups, preferences, consumers income, good
characteristics, advertising design, and price mark-ups.
The model gives interesting starting points for further research on reference
group theory, design of advertising, empirical evaluation of advertising and
government intervention.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Kuhn-Tucker Optimization in Absence of Adver-
tising
First, note that in the optimum the budget constraint must be binding, i.e.
mi =Mi   pxi.
Furthermore, we cannot simply apply Kuhn-Tucker, because the utility
function is not continuously di¤erentiable. Rather we have to check rst
whether any of the kinks in the function is a candidate for a relative extremum.
Since the function is concave, continuous and continuously di¤erentiable in the
environment of every such point xj, we can evaluate the left-hand and the right-
hand derivatives of Ui(xi) = u(xi) +Mi   pxi at every xi = xj < Mip for all
j = 2; :::; n. If U 0i(xi) changes signs (from positive to negative) at some xi = xj,
then Ui(xi) has its maximum there. If there is no xi for which this is the case,
then we have to check for extrema in the parts in which Ui(xi) is continu-
ously di¤erentiable. We do so by applying Kuhn-Tucker. The corresponding
Langrangian is
L(xi; 1; 2) = i(xi)
 i 1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi); 0g+Mi   pxi
+1xi + 2(Mi   pxi)
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the rst order conditions for which are
@L
@xi
= 0i(xi) + i
1
n  1n
H(xi)
0
i(xi)  p+ 1   2p  0
xi
@L
@xi
= xi

0i(xi) + i
1
n  1n
H(xi)
0
i(xi)  p+ 1   2p

= 0
@L
@1
= xi  0
1
@L
@1
= 1xi = 0
@L
@2
= Mi   pxi  0
2
@L
@2
= 2 (Mi   pxi) = 0
where nH is dened as the number of peers j who consume more than i at
given xi, i.e. all peers j with xj > xi. These Kuhn-Tucker conditions describe
two possible sorts of equilibria:
1. The corner solution of xi =
Mi
p
In this case 1 = 0, 2 > 0 and 
0
i(x

i ) =
1+2
1+i
1
n 1n
H(xi )
p
2. The inner solution 0 < xi <
Mi
p
and xi 6= xj. In this case 1 = 0, 2 = 0
and 0i(x

i ) =
1
1+i
1
n 1n
H(xi )
p
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. ui(xi) = 0i(xi) + i
1
n 1n
H(xi)
0
i(xi) where n
H is dened as the
number of peers j who consume more than i at given xi, i.e. all peers j with
xj > xi. Since marginal utility is decreasing in xi, the rst statement is true
if MUpre advertisingjxi<xm MUafter advertisingjxi 6=xj andxi<xm
) 0i(xi) +i 1n 1nH0i(xi)  0i(xi) +i 1n 1+1(nH +1)0i(xi), nH  n  1
which is true by denition.
The second statement is true ifMUpre advertisingjxi 6=xj and xi2]xm;maxfxm;xmaxj g[
 MUafter advertisingjxi 6=xj and xi2]xm;maxfxm;xmaxj g[. Since for any xi 6= xj and
xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g[ we have nHpre advertising = nHafter advertising it follows
that 0i(xi) + i
1
n 1n
H0i(xi)  0i(xi) + i 1n 1+1(nH)0i(xi) , 1  0. The
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third statement is true, because here nHpre advertising = n
H
after advertising = 0 and
therefore 0i(xi) = 
0
i(xi).
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. To nd the optimum we proceed in the same way as in 3.A.1. The
results are identical except that here we have nHad instead of n
H and nad = n+1.
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions again describe two possible sorts
of equilibria:
1. The corner solution of xadi =
Mi
p
In this case 1 = 0, 2 > 0 and 
0
i(x
ad
i ) =
1+2
1+i
1
n
nHad(x
ad
i )
p
2. The inner solution 0 < xadi <
Mi
p
and xadi 6= xj. In this case 1 = 0,
2 = 0 and 
0
i(x
ad
i ) =
1
1+i
1
n
nHad(x
ad
i )
p
Let us rst consider the inner solution. For every xadi < xm we have
nHad > n
H . Then the rst order conditions imply 0i(x
ad
i ) < 
0
i(x

i ), if xi 6= xj.
Since i(xi) is concave, this in turn means that x
ad
i > x

i . For all other xi 6= xj
the proof is analogously.
Second, suppose before advertising we had optimal consumption at a kink,
i.e. xi = xj. This implies that lim
xi%x j
u0i(x

i ) > p and lim
xi&x+j
u0i(x

i ) < p. Advertis-
ing changes these limits of u0i(xi). But it is possible that the changes are not
strong enough, so that xadi = x

i . If they are strong enough, however, the same
analysis applies as for the inner solution.
Third, suppose that in the pre-advertising situation i consumed at a corner
solution, i.e. xi =
Mi
p
. Obviously, advertising does not change this consump-
tion, if xm > xi (because consumption already exhausts i
0s budget), nor if
xi > maxfxm; xmaxj g (because the derivative is left unchanged). If, however,
xm <
Mi
p
< xmaxj , then consumption can be decreased if the associated fall in
marginal utility is substantial enough. Otherwise it is left unchanged.
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3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. The welfare di¤erence is given by:
W = W ad  W  = i(xadi )  i(xi )
 i 1
n
 
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xadi ); 0g+maxfi(xm)  i(xadi ); 0g
!
+i
1
n  1
nX
j 6=i
maxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g+ c(xi   xadi )  A
We will now prove the three statements of proposition 3.3 consecutively:
1. Since in this range we have xad > xi , the welfare e¤ect is given by:
W = W ad  W  =
>0z }| {
i(x
ad
i )  i(xi )
<0z }| {
+c(xi   xadi )
<0z}|{
 A
+i
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g
 i 1n
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xadi ); 0g+maxfi(xm)  i(xadi ); 0g

| {z }
70 (because the addition of the peer at xm can decrease the average deviation from peers)
which is ambiguous.
2. For any xi 2]xm;maxfxm; xmaxj g[ we know that also xadi cannot be smaller
than xm, because below xm the derivative is even larger than in the pre-
advertising situation. The welfare e¤ect is therefore described by
W = W ad  W  =
<0z }| {
i(x
ad
i )  i(xi )
>0z }| {
+c(xi   xadi )
<0z}|{
 A
+i
1
n 1
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xi ); 0g
 i 1n
Pn
j 6=imaxfi(xj)  i(xadi ); 0g

| {z }
70 (because of a possible increase in peers with xj>xAdi in reaction to decreasing demand)
which is ambiguous.
3. To prove that W = 0 for all xi > maxfxm; xmaxj g, note rst that in
this range xadi = x

i . Since also n
H
ad = n
H = 0, we have W =  A.
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